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I. INTRODUCTION 
The allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts is a 
core concern of our American federal system.  Article III of the 
Constitution grants federal jurisdiction over a specific, limited list of 
cases and controversies.1  Reinforcing the constitutional scheme is the 
understanding that federal subject matter jurisdiction is not self-
executing; Congress must affirmatively grant to federal courts the 
exercise of the categories of federal jurisdiction allowed by Article III.2  
All cases and controversies not brought within federal jurisdiction by the 
Constitution and Congress are allocated to state courts. 
The question that has caused the most analytical difficulty for the 
allocation of jurisdiction over the past century is whether a federal court 
has original federal question jurisdiction when an issue of federal law is 
embedded in a claim created by state law.  This question is relatively 
narrow in the field of federal jurisdiction,3 yet the Supreme Court of the 
                                                     
 ∗ Professor of Law, Hamline University, St. Paul, MN; J.D., New York University, 1971; 
Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1983. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2. See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 60 n.2, § 3526 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing limits on 
federal jurisdiction). 
 3. First, this Article discusses only one type of federal jurisdiction, commonly called federal 
question jurisdiction, comprised of “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
Second, this Article is not about cases that present both federal claims and state claims, or a 
federal claim with state law issues; in those cases, the federal court is empowered to determine state 
law properly included in the federal case.  This federal power over the entire case was first 
elaborated in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824), superseded 
by statute, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1349, 62 Stat. 869, 934, and most recently is embodied in 
the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). 
Third, this Article is about original federal jurisdiction.  Appellate jurisdiction presents different 
concerns, e.g., wasted lower court litigation and exercise of discretion.  See infra note 302 and 
accompanying text (discussing the scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).  See 
generally Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1969) 
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United States—not to mention lower federal courts—has returned to this 
issue again and again, sometimes answering yes4 and more often 
answering no.5  On each return, the Court’s analysis grows more 
complex rather than more precise.6 
Some writers refer to these cases as “hybrid” or “mixed” claims of 
federal and state law.7  This Article rejects those labels because they beg 
the question: of course a “hybrid” or “mixed” claim of federal law and 
state law includes a federal question.  The better, more accurate, 
reference is a federal issue “embedded” within a claim created by state 
law. 
This Article proposes that the Supreme Court apply Ockham’s razor 
by returning to an earlier understanding of “arising under.”  A claim 
arises under the law that creates it.  A claim created by Congress is a 
federal question.8  A claim created by state statute or state common law 
is not a federal question.  So said the Court with power and elegant 
simplicity nearly a century ago,9 and so it should say again.  The 
distinction is analytically sound, and it respects the constitutional and 
congressional allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts. 
Part II begins by briefly tracing federal question jurisdiction from its 
first conferral in 1875 to the present.  The early cases converge into the 
rule of American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.: a case arises 
under the law that creates the claim.10  As the years accumulate, the 
Supreme Court begins accreting layers onto the rule.  In 2005, the Court 
                                                                                                                                  
(discussing circumstances under which there is federal original and appellate jurisdiction in cases 
involving hybrid state law). 
 4. E.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 
(2005); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 202 (1921). 
 5. E.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. 
v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633; Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 
109, 116–18 (1936); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1934); Am. Well 
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 257 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. 
W. Union Tel. Co., 237 U.S. 300, 303 (1915); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 
25 (1913); Miller’s Ex’rs v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132, 136–37 (1893). 
 6. See infra Part II.D–E (discussing the history and development of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis). 
 7. See, e.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise 
“Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 897 (1967) (“mixed” claim); Greene, supra 
note 3, at 289 (“hybrid” claim); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway?  A Reconsideration 
of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 17 
(1985) (using both terms); Kenneth Lee Marshall, Note, Understanding Merrell Dow: Federal 
Question Jurisdiction for State-Federal Hybrid Cases, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 219, 219 (1999) (“hybrid” 
cases). 
 8. See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 9. Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260. 
 10. Id. 
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announces in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering 
& Manufacturing11 that a federal court must work through a multifactor 
test to decide whether a federal issue embedded in a state law claim 
constitutes a case “arising under.”12 
Part III argues that the accumulated analysis in this area by the 
Supreme Court is problematical for many reasons, including 
disrespecting the constitutional language,13 usurping authority from 
Congress over federal jurisdiction,14 running contrary to its other 
decisions on federal jurisdiction,15 and creating a malleable equity guide 
instead of a jurisdictional rule.16  Grable & Sons produces and promotes 
an inappropriate allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal 
courts.17 
Part IV argues the Court should clarify jurisdiction law by 
readopting the American Well Works rule that a case arises under the law 
that creates the claim.18  This Part also responds to arguments that may 
be made against the rule.19 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 
A. 1875 Act and Early Interpretations 
The early history of federal question jurisdiction has been much 
traced.20  While Article III of the Constitution grants authority to extend 
federal jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal law, Congress did 
not exercise that authority in the Judiciary Act of 1789.21  This decision 
                                                     
 11. 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 2368. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. See infra Part III.D. 
 17. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 18. See infra Part IV.A. 
 19. See infra Part IV.B. 
 20. See, e.g., Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question 
Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1490 n.40 (1991) (outlining Congress’s 
“curious” history); G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. 
REV. 17, 27–33 (1947) (discussing Reconstruction and the 1875 Act); James H. Chadbourn & A. 
Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 639–45 (1942) 
(discussing the history of the Judiciary Act and the 1875 Act); Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No 
Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes 
of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601–07 (1987) (discussing the history 
surrounding the 1875 Act). 
 21. Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 640. 
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may well have been a reasoned compromise between proponents and 
opponents of federal courts.22  The Federalists, on the way out of office, 
included the jurisdiction in the Midnight Judges’ Act of 1801,23 but the 
Jeffersonians repealed it a year later.24  Not until 1875, ten years after the 
Civil War, did Congress act again to exercise that authority.25 
Even then, the jurisdictional grant may have been “sneak” 
legislation.26  For whatever reason, the legislative history of the 1875 Act 
is sadly short and sketchy.27  Consequently, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the “arising under” language of the statute with little or no 
assistance from legislative history. 
One area of interpretation of the statute that is not the subject of this 
Article is whether a claim created by federal law always presents a case 
“arising under.”  To this question, the Supreme Court wavered.  Faced 
with a flood of new cases in federal courts,28 the Court quickly decided 
not to follow the welcoming interpretation of the nearly identical 
constitutional language.29  Far from holding that whenever federal law 
provides an ingredient the case is one “arising under,” the Court decided 
that even when federal law creates the claim, it does not necessarily arise 
under unless a substantial question of construction of federal law is 
presented.30 
                                                     
 22. Id. at 641; Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 53, 131 (1923). 
 23. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 
2 Stat. 132, 132. 
 24. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. at 132. 
 25. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (“That the circuit courts of the 
United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all 
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or treaties made . . . .”).  The operative “arising under” language was taken from U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, and has endured through the years to the present day in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2000). 
 26. Bergman, supra note 20, at 27; Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 643.  
 27. See infra note 132 (noting that the only history is a statement by Senator Matthew H. 
Carpenter that the Act was intended to grant full constitutional authority). 
 28. This new federal question jurisdiction, plus growth in the diversity caseload, “opened wide 
a flood of totally new business for the federal courts.”  FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, 
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928). 
 29. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819–28 (1824), superseded by statute, 
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1349, 62 Stat. 869, 934. 
 30. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877).  Only two years after 
passage of the 1875 Act, the Supreme Court decided Gold-Washing.  While the holding of the case 
was grounded in fine nuances of code fact pleading, the Court did discuss at length the necessity that 
a federal question case present a controversy “which depends upon the construction or effect of 
[federal law].”  Id. at 203–04. 
Cases a decade later went both ways.  Compare Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 
(1885) (tort action against federally chartered railroads a federal question), and Feibelman v. 
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B. The Rule that a Case Arises Under the Law that Creates the Claim Is 
Formed over Years and Repeated in American Well Works 
The second area of interpretation is a seeming mirror image of the 
first.31  Can a case ever arise under federal law when state law creates the 
claim?  To this question, the Supreme Court gave a firm and clear 
answer: no.32 
The case typically cited for this proposition is American Well Works.  
The plaintiff and defendant manufactured and marketed competing 
pumps.33  The plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the defendant had 
taken three actions against users of the plaintiff’s pump: told them it 
infringed the defendant’s patent, sued some of them for infringement, 
and threatened to sue others.34  The plaintiff sued the defendant in tort for 
slander of title; the allegations also appeared to give rise to unfair 
competition, another tort.35 
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, began by pointing out the standard rule that a plaintiff was the 
master of its own complaint.36  The plaintiff’s declaration was in state 
                                                                                                                                  
Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1883) (suit to collect on marshal’s bond required by federal statute a 
federal question), with Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 588 (1888) (suit on federal judgment 
ordinary property rights action), and Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 259 (1885) (injunction 
against ferries did not depend on construction of federal charter).  Not long after, the Court 
announced that even a congressionally created action to determine adverse mining right interests was 
not a case “arising under” because the decision turned on local rules and mining customs.  Shoshone 
Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508, 513 (1900).  By 1912, the Court had settled on the 
following rule: 
A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not 
necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so 
arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the 
validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result 
depends. 
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).  The Court’s underlying concern was clear when it 
added “[t]his is especially so of a suit involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United 
States.  If it were not, every suit to establish title to land in the central and western States would so 
arise . . . .”  Id. 
 31. One might think that because a case created by federal law sometimes does not present a 
federal question, see supra note 30, a case created by state law might sometimes present a federal 
question.  The parallel does not follow, however, because of the limited nature of the jurisdiction of 
federal courts. 
 32. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (“A suit arises under 
the law that creates the cause of action.”). 
 33. Id. at 258–59. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 258. 
 36. “Of course the question depends upon the plaintiff’s declaration.”  Id.  For this proposition, 
the opinion cited the three-year-old decision in The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 
(1913).  Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 258. 
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tort law, not for infringement of patent.  “A suit for damages to business 
caused by a threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the 
patent law,” said the Court.37  At that point, Justice Holmes could have 
wrapped up the opinion by applying the familiar rule that a federal 
question cannot arise in defense.38  Instead, he added an additional 
section to the opinion that included the famous words “[a] suit arises 
under the law that creates the cause of action.”39 
While the famous sentence may thus appear to have been an ill-
considered, casual dictum, it was not.  First, the opinion hinted at 
application of the rule that a federal question cannot arise in defense, but 
it did not follow the path to that result; instead, it followed a different 
path to conclude that “[t]he state is master of the whole matter.”40  
Second, five years later, Justice Holmes—albeit in dissent—quoted the 
sentence as “the ratio decidendi” of the case.41  Third, and most 
importantly, Justice Holmes was not making law, but instead was 
repeating well-settled law.  Likely, that is the reason he wrote so 
cryptically. 
The rule of American Well Works had been emerging for at least 
three decades.  Even to say the rule was emerging understates its clarity 
and force, for it sprang full-grown twenty-three years earlier in Miller’s 
Executors v. Swann.42  The state of Alabama received lands from 
Congress for the construction of railroads and passed the lands on to the 
railroad companies.  Following bankruptcy of one of the railroads, the 
                                                     
 37. Id. at 259.  The plaintiff alleged it had, or had applied for, a patent on its pump.  Id. at 258.  
Probably not wishing to wait until the patent was issued so it could sue for patent infringement, it 
sued in tort. 
 38. The Court had decided Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), 
less than a decade earlier, although the rule can be traced back much earlier.  Tennessee v. Union & 
Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894), identified the rule as well-settled. 
 39. Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260.  The use of the phrase “cause of action,” now 
obsolete in federal practice, is jarring to modern ears.  One leading hornbook even misquotes the 
sentence as “‘a suit arises under the law that creates the action.’” CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY 
KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 105–06 (6th ed. 2002).  Yet substitution of the 
modern equivalent “claim” does not damage the meaning of the sentence.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 40. The concluding sentence of the opinion is “[t]he state is master of the whole matter, and if it 
saw fit to do away with actions of this type altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose that they 
still could be maintained under the patent laws of the United States.”  Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. 
at 260. 
 41. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 215 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 42. 150 U.S. 132, 136–37 (1893).  This decision had been foreshadowed by paired decisions 
rendered ten years earlier—and only eight years after congressional grant of federal question 
jurisdiction in 1875.  In Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1883), the Court found 
federal question jurisdiction in a suit to enforce a marshal’s bond because the bond was required by 
federal statute; in Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1883), the Court found no federal question 
jurisdiction in an action for breach of a contract for payment of royalties on patented products. 
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state attempted to reconvey the land to another.43  The validity of the 
conveyance depended on interpretation of the original act of Congress.44  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice David Brewer, 
announced that the case presented “nothing of a Federal character.”  
Justice Brewer explained as follows:45 
The fact that the state statute and the mortgage refer to certain acts of 
Congress as prescribing the rule and measure of the rights granted by 
the State, does not make the determination of such rights a Federal 
question.  A State may prescribe the procedure in the Federal courts as 
the rule of practice in its own tribunals; it may authorize the disposal of 
its own lands in accordance with the provisions for the sale of the 
public lands of the United States; and in such cases an examination 
may be necessary of the acts of Congress, the rules of the Federal 
courts, and the practices of the Land Department, and yet the questions 
for decision would not be of a Federal character.  The inquiry along 
Federal lines is only incidental to a determination of the local question 
of what the State has required and prescribed.  The matter decided is 
one of state rule and practice.  The facts by which that state rule and 
practice are determined may be of a Federal origin.46 
In a large sense, therefore, the American Well Works rule, so often called 
the Holmes rule, could instead be called the Brewer rule. 
This rule of Miller’s Executors was applied in three more cases, all 
authored by Justice Holmes, over the following three decades.47  The 
clearest statement was in Louisville & Nashville Railroad.  A New York 
telegraph company attempted to exercise eminent domain under a 
Louisiana state statute.48  The defendant argued the foreign corporation 
was prohibited from operating in Louisiana; the telegraph company 
                                                     
 43. Miller’s Ex’rs, 150 U.S. at 133. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 136. 
 46. Id. at 136–37. 
 47. Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 237 U.S. 300, 301–03 
(1915) was the last of these three cases.  In Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 207 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1907), Justice Holmes opined as follows: 
If the [state] charter, instead of writing out the requirements of [the act of Congress], 
referred specifically to another document expressing them, and purported to incorporate 
it, of course the charter would have the same effect as if it itself contained the words.  If 
the document was identified, it would not matter what its own nature or effect might be, 
as the force given to it by reference and incorporation would be derived wholly from the 
charter. 
Cf. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (“[T]he party who brings a suit 
is master to decide what law he will rely upon and therefore does determine whether he will bring a 
‘suit arising under’ the patent or other law of the United States by his declaration or bill.”). 
 48. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 237 U.S. at 301. 
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pleaded an act of Congress in support of its argument that the state could 
not exclude it.49  Justice Holmes wrote for the Court: 
[W]hen, as here, the foundation of the right claimed is a state law, the 
suit to assert it arises under the state law none the less that the state law 
has attached a condition that only alien legislation can fulfil.  The state 
law is the sole determinant of the conditions supposed, and its reference 
elsewhere for their fulfilment is like the reference to a document that it 
adopts and makes part of itself.  The suit is not maintained by virtue of 
the Act of Congress but by virtue of the Louisiana statute that allows 
itself to be satisfied by that Act.50 
Little wonder that, in the next year, Justice Holmes could confidently 
write—for a unanimous Court—that “[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action.”51  This law did not spring unexpectedly from 
Justice Holmes’s brow; it was a summary, stated more sparsely, of 
settled law that had formed over three decades. 
C. After a Hard Case Intervenes, the Court Returns to the Rule 
Only five years after American Well Works, the Court decided Smith 
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.52  Smith was a hard case.53 
A shareholder of the corporate defendant sued under state 
corporation law to enjoin the corporation’s directors from breaching their 
fiduciary duty by investing in federal farm loan bonds.54  This would be a 
breach of fiduciary duty, the shareholder alleged, because the act of 
Congress authorizing the bonds was unconstitutional.55  Since state 
corporation law created the claim, American Well Works dictated the 
Court refuse federal jurisdiction.56 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 302. 
 50. Id. at 303. 
 51. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 52. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
 53. One commentator described the circumstances surrounding the case as follows: 
[T]he stakes were high, the issue urgent, and the case of national importance: the 
marketability of a bond program for the relief of farmers was impaired until the Supreme 
Court resolved the constitutionality of enabling legislation.  The parties did not challenge 
either the jurisdiction of the district court or the resulting jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to grant direct review and thus to issue an expeditious judgment. 
John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What 
“Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1838 (1998); see also infra Part III.D.2 
(discussing how hard cases lead to bad law in this area). 
 54. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra text accompanying note 39 (stating “a suit arises under the law that creates the 
 
MCFARLAND FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:37:19 PM 
2006] THE TRUE COMPASS 9 
The long opinion of the Court in Smith did not cite or discuss either 
American Well Works or any of the cases leading up to it.  The Smith 
opinion ignored a heated dissent by Justice Holmes arguing both for the 
correctness of existing law57 and for the doctrine of precedent.58  The 
Smith Court did not appear to recognize it was interpreting the 
jurisdictional statute; instead, it leaped backwards a century to the 
expansive interpretation of the similar constitutional language.59 
The key reasoning of Smith was that “the controversy concerns the 
constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn in 
question.  The decision depends upon the determination of this issue.”60  
In other words, the constitutionality of the act of Congress authorizing 
farm loan bonds was the issue in the case.  Of course, that reasoning was 
not particularly powerful because the same thing could be said about 
many cases in which a federal issue was raised for the first time in 
defense.  In the end, Smith appeared to be a one-time-only hard case. 
                                                                                                                                  
cause of action”). 
 57. Despite recognizing the desirability of the decision in the case, Justice Holmes dissented, 
arguing as follows in support of existing law: 
  It is evident that the cause of action arises not under any law of the United States but 
wholly under Missouri law.  The defendant is a Missouri corporation and the right 
claimed is that of a stockholder to prevent the directors from doing an act, that is, making 
an investment, alleged to be contrary to their duty.  But the scope of their duty depends 
upon the charter of their corporation and other laws of Missouri.  . . . If the Missouri law 
authorizes or forbids the investment according to the determination of this Court upon a 
point under the Constitution or acts of Congress, still that point is material only because 
the Missouri law saw fit to make it so.  The whole foundation of the duty is Missouri law, 
which at its sole will incorporate[] the other law as it might incorporate a document.  The 
other law or document depends for its relevance and effect not on its own force but upon 
the law that took it up . . . . 
  But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action by its own force, for it is 
the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United States.  The 
mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a criterion or test, when the law of 
the United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under the state law to 
be also a case under the law of the United States, and so it has been decided by this Court 
again and again. 
Smith, 255 U.S. at 214–15 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  The above language is the 
fuller statement of the rule Justice Holmes states so cryptically in American Well Works.  It clearly 
draws on the language and reasoning of Louisville & Nashville Railroad and Interstate Consolidated 
Street Railway.  See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (discussing these two cases); cf. Pratt 
v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (stating that federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases arising under patent law, but state courts can decide questions regarding 
patent law). 
 58. “[American Well Works] is a decision, reached not without discussion and with but a single 
dissent . . . .  I know of no decisions to the contrary and see no reason for overruling it now.”  Smith, 
255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 59. The Court relied on Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821) and Osborn v. 
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824), superseded by statute, Act of June 
25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1349, 62 Stat. 869, 934.  Smith, 255 U.S. at 199. 
 60. Smith, 255 U.S. at 201. 
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Indeed, a decade later, the Court rendered three decisions in three 
years consistent with American Well Works, but not with Smith.  
Amazingly, the Court failed to cast even a nod of recognition to either of 
these precedents. 
The first of the three cases was Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.61  The 
unanimous decision, while deciding the citizenship status of an 
unincorporated sociedad en comandita for diversity jurisdiction 
purposes, also rejected an alternative argument for federal question 
jurisdiction, holding as follows: “Federal jurisdiction . . . may not be 
invoked where the right asserted is non-federal, merely because the 
plaintiff’s right to sue is derived from federal law . . . .”62 
The next year, the Court approached federal jurisdiction indirectly in 
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway.63  The plaintiff sued in two 
counts and obtained a verdict, but the verdict could not stand if venue 
had been improperly laid.  The second count was pursuant to a Kentucky 
statute that “reproduced in substance, and with almost literal exactness, 
the corresponding provisions” of a federal statute.64  A decision that the 
second count arose under the federal statute would mean reversal 
because of that statute’s venue provision. 
The Court decided that the state had incorporated into its own statute 
the duty prescribed by the federal statute.  As such, the second count 
arose entirely under the Kentucky statute, not the embedded federal  
 
                                                     
 61. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). 
 62. Id. at 483.  The Court rationalized as follows: 
The federal nature of the right to be established is decisive—not the source of the 
authority to establish it.  The case is analogous to those involving rights to land granted 
under laws or treaties of the United States.  Where the complaint shows only that such 
was the source of the plaintiff’s title, the case is not one within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 
Id. at 483–84 (citations omitted). 
Here, the Court said that a state law right to sue “derived from federal law” did not create 
federal jurisdiction.  A state law right to sue sounding in breach of fiduciary duty, with the reason for 
that breach of duty derived from federal law, seems another step removed from federal 
jurisdiction—yet that was the situation in Smith.  See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text 
(discussing Smith). 
The Russell & Co. result was entirely consistent with American Well Works and the dissent in 
Smith.  This observation was previously made by Ernest J. London, “Federal Question” 
Jurisdiction—A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 852 (1959). 
 63. 291 U.S. 205 (1934). 
 64. Id. at 212. 
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statute.65  State law incorporating the duty standard of a federal statute 
did not raise a federal question. 
The third decision achieved great acclaim.  The opinion in Gully v. 
First National Bank in Meridian,66 authored by Justice Benjamin N. 
Cardozo, has been celebrated for its striking prose.67  What has not 
commonly been recognized is that the result and the opinion in Gully 
were entirely consistent with American Well Works and constituted a 
clear, albeit implicit, rejection of Smith. 
The plaintiff, a state tax collector, sued in state court to collect a 
money judgment based on the defendant national bank’s undertaking to 
assume the tax liabilities of a predecessor national bank.  The defendant 
removed to federal court on the ground that “the power to lay a tax upon 
the shares of national banks has its origin and measure in the provisions 
of a federal statute, and that by necessary implication a plaintiff counts 
upon the statute in suing for the tax.”68 
The Court, after rummaging through earlier tests for federal question 
jurisdiction, concluded as follows: 
We recur to the test announced in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., supra: 
“The federal nature of the right to be established is decisive—not the 
source of the authority to establish it.”  Here the right to be established 
is one created by the state.  If that is so, it is unimportant that federal 
consent is the source of state authority.69 
                                                     
 65. Id. at 216–17.  Since the second count arose under state law, the federal venue statute did 
not apply, and the verdict for the injured railroad worker stood.  A critic of the decision might point 
out that this—like Smith—presented something of a hard case.  See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the 
effect of hard cases in this area). 
 66. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
 67. Justice Cardozo wrote of the need for a “common-sense accommodation of judgment to 
kaleidoscopic situations,” and concluded as follows: 
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have 
their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the 
Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power.  To set 
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies 
that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those 
that are merely possible.  We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by. 
Id. at 117–18.  As one commentator wrote of this language, “[n]o other jurist in American history 
has delivered himself with the clarity of thought and beauty of expression which habitually 
characterized the opinions of Justice Cardozo.”  Bergman, supra note 20, at 40.  Others rightfully 
noted “[t]his is prose so beautiful that it seems almost profane to analyze it” before they proceeded 
to point out that a court cannot determine what is necessary and what is collateral when it is not 
allowed to look at the defense.  Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 671. 
 68. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at 116. 
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The link from American Well Works through Puerto Rico and Moore is 
clear.  Because the plaintiff’s claim arose from state contract law, Gully 
presented no federal question. 
The opinion could have concluded, yet Justice Cardozo wrote 
further, explaining “[a]nother line of reasoning will lead us to the same 
conclusion.”70  After this introduction, he wrote the famous words of 
kaleidoscopic situations, collateral controversies, and compasses.71  The 
Gully opinion has often been thought to reject federal jurisdiction based 
on a balancing, careful weighing of what is basic and what is collateral, 
but the introductory language to this section of the opinion makes clear 
that such a weighing was at best an alternative holding, if not outright 
dictum.  The primary holding was that federal question jurisdiction did 
not exist because the claim arose under state contract law. 
Following Puerto Rico, Moore, and Gully, the law was clear: a claim 
arises under the law that creates it; a federal issue embedded in a claim 
created by state law does not establish federal question jurisdiction.72  
The law was American Well Works.  Smith stood alone. 
The Supreme Court did not issue another decision in the area for 
nearly fifty years.73  Unfortunately, this left both the lower federal courts 
and the commentators on their own to struggle to make sense of Smith.  
Their work during that half-century appears to have misdirected the 
Supreme Court onto a more complicated path.74 
D. The More Complicated Path to Pragmatism 
The Supreme Court next directly addressed original jurisdiction over 
a federal issue embedded in a state law claim in Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.75  A state tax board sued to 
collect unpaid state income taxes from a trust formed by construction 
                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 117–18; see also supra note 67 (quoting and discussing the passage). 
 72. See supra Part II.B (discussing the law’s formation); see also Hirshman, supra note 7, at 31 
(“[D]ecisions . . . adhered to the more restrictive standard of American Well Works.”); London, 
supra note 62, at 853 (arguing that the “dominant trend” of cases through Gully makes clear that 
“incidental” federal questions are insufficient to obtain federal jurisdiction if the “cause of action 
itself was not created by federal law”). 
 73. In the area of appellate jurisdiction, the Court decided Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 
U.S. 481 (1942), and Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944), two cases involving state tax law.  
Neither case relied on, or even cited, Smith, although Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting in 
Flournoy, lamented that the Court was applying Smith.  Id. at 265–66, 270–72. 
 74. See infra Part II.D (describing the Court’s more complicated path to pragmatism). 
 75. 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633. 
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industry employer associations and a union.76  Count one of the state 
court complaint sought unpaid state tax levies, and count two asked for a 
declaration that future levies would be honored.77  The defendant trust 
fund removed and alleged federal preemption.78  The Court concluded 
the case “was not within the removal jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441” and did not reach the preemption question.79 
This result could have been reached by a straightforward application 
of the American Well Works rule that the claim arose under state law.  
Instead, the opinion of the Court, authored by Justice William J. 
Brennan, eschewed that workable rule and turned the Court onto a path 
of ever-more-complicated analysis.  That is notable; even more notable is 
that the opinion did so in a single paragraph that misused precedents and 
other authorities in support of reasoning that, in the end, was mere ipse 
dixit.  The key paragraph of Franchise Tax Board, with commentary 
inserted by way of footnotes, reads as follows: 
The most familiar definition of the statutory “arising under” limitation 
is Justice Holmes’ statement, “A suit arises under the law that creates 
the cause of action.”  However, it is well settled that Justice Holmes’ 
test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come 
within the district courts’ original jurisdiction than it is for describing 
which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction.80  We have often 
held that a case “arose under” federal law where the vindication of a 
right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal 
                                                     
 76. Id. at 4–7. 
 77. Id. at 5–7. 
 78. Id. at 7. 
 79. Id. 
 80. This assertion was taken, without attribution, from T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 
827 (2d Cir. 1964), in which Judge Henry Friendly wrote “[i]t has come to be realized that Mr. 
Justice Holmes’ formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was 
intended.”  In T. B. Harms, the plaintiff patent holder had contracted away the rights to its patents in 
exchange for contract royalties, and sued for the royalties.  Id. at 824–25.  Even though eighty-one 
years earlier the Supreme Court had decided, in Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 618 (1883), that this 
very situation was a garden-variety contract action, Judge Friendly did not cite the precedent.  
Instead, he began a long, speculative discussion of how a federal court might “realize” a state-
created claim could produce a federal question.  T. B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827–28.  The problem was 
that the sole authorities he could point to for this “realization” were the “path-breaking opinion” in 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), and the “recent application” of De 
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).  T. B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.  The isolation of Smith has 
already been discussed.  See supra Part II.C.  De Sylva provided no support at all.  The case involved 
the issue of who could renew a copyright.  De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 572.  In answering the question, the 
Court looked in part to state law for guidance.  Id. at 580–82.  This was not a situation of federal law 
embedded in a state claim; state law was embedded in a federal claim. 
Unfortunately, this casual, assertive dismissal of the American Well Works rule has been 
uncritically repeated as accepted law.  E.g., 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3562, 
at 25 n.23. 
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law,81 and even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has 
admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle.82  
Leading commentators have suggested that for purposes of § 1331 an 
action “arises under” federal law “if in order for the plaintiff to secure 
the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and 
the applicability to his case of a proposition of federal law.”83 
Franchise Tax Board has faded from importance today, except as the 
Supreme Court’s first word on a federal issue embedded in a state law 
claim in fifty years.  That first word was to abandon the settled law of 
American Well Works84 in the cause of expanding federal jurisdiction.85 
Only two years later, the Court reconsidered this area of the law in 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson.86  Two separate, 
“virtually identical” actions—one by plaintiffs residing in Scotland and 
                                                     
 81. The opinion asserts “often” but cites only two cases: Smith and Hopkins v. Walker, 244 
U.S. 486 (1917).  Smith is already familiar.  See supra Part II.C.  Hopkins is more intriguing.  The 
plaintiff sued to remove a cloud on title to land obtained through a federal land grant.  Hopkins, 244 
U.S. at 489.  One view is that the case does offer support for federal jurisdiction because an action to 
remove a cloud on title is created by state law.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 881 
(5th ed. 2003).  The opposing view is that Hopkins offers little or no support because the plaintiff 
was suing to clear title to land obtained through federal land grants.  This view makes the case more 
akin to suits arising out of federal land grants that plagued the federal courts after Pacific Railroad 
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).  See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.  Certainly 
Justice Holmes did not see Hopkins as any threat to American Well Works.  Hopkins was a 
unanimous decision issued only a year after American Well Works.  Another four years later, Holmes 
dissented vigorously in Smith.  255 U.S. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 82. The citation was to a dissent by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 
253, 270–72 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  After hinting that Smith should be overruled, and 
stating “[m]uch is to be said for the reasoning of Mr. Justice Holmes in [his dissent in Smith],” 
Frankfurter noted “his view was rejected.”  Id. at 265–66, 270–71.  One thus cannot say that Justice 
Brennan’s reference to the Frankfurter dissent was wrong.  This prop is gossamer thin, however.  
Justice Frankfurter was referring to Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483 (1942), which, 
like Flournoy, involved appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction.  See infra note 302 
(explaining the Court’s hospitality to original federal jurisdiction over a case with a federal issue 
embedded in a state law claim as concern for its appellate jurisdiction). 
 83. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8–9 (footnotes added) (citations omitted).  The primary 
citation for the last sentence of the paragraph was to PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1973).  Far from being the positive support that Justice Brennan represented, the 
authors were actually challenging law students to consider “[w]ould it be sound to conclude” a 
federal question arises under the quoted circumstances!  Id.  The opinion added a signal to instruct 
the reader to compare Hart & Wechsler’s book to T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d 
Cir. 1964).  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9; see also supra note 80 (explaining the T. B. Harms 
Co. case involved a situation of federal law embedded in a state claim, rather than state law 
embedded in a federal claim). 
 84. See supra Part II.B–C (discussing American Well Works at length). 
 85. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text (analyzing Franchise Tax Board’s impact on 
federal jurisdiction). 
 86. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
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the other by plaintiffs residing in Canada—were filed against the 
defendant, the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin, in state court in 
Ohio.87  Each complaint contained six counts.  Five of the counts were 
agreed by all to be purely state common law: negligence, breach of 
warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence.88  In Count IV, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the drug was “misbranded” in violation of federal 
law because the label failed to give adequate warning and that this 
misbranding “‘constitute[d] a rebuttable presumption of negligence.’”89  
Arguing that these identical Count IVs pleaded federal questions, the 
defendant removed the cases to federal court where the two cases were 
consolidated.90  Arguing that the federal statute merely provided the 
standard of care of a state negligence tort, plaintiffs moved to remand.91  
Relying on Smith, the district court denied remand.92  The district court 
then granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non 
conveniens.93  The Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the case remanded 
to state court.94 
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
began by recognizing that the “‘vast majority’” of federal question cases 
“are covered by Justice Holmes’ statement that a ‘suit arises under the 
law that creates the cause of action.’”95  The opinion then strode along 
the path of Smith and Franchise Tax Board toward the “need for careful 
judgments about the exercise of federal judicial power in an area of 
uncertain jurisdiction.”96  The Court then went off in a surprising new 
                                                     
 87. Id. at 805. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 805–06. 
 90. Id. at 806. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  Merrell Dow was another hard case.  Both sides were engaged in obvious forum 
shopping.  In this case, however, the hard equities did not all point in one direction.  See infra notes 
218–21 and accompanying text (discussing the forum-shopping in Merrell Dow). 
 94. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806–07.  Relying on the requirement of Franchise Tax Board that 
the plaintiff’s “‘right to relief depended necessarily on a substantial question of federal law,’” the 
Sixth Circuit reasoned the jury could find negligence on the part of defendant with or without 
finding a violation of the federal statute.  Id. at 807 (quoting Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1985)).  Therefore, the result did not necessarily depend on a 
question of federal law.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 808 (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 
(1916)). 
 96. Id. at 814.  Here, the Court seemed to be following two law review articles that proposed a 
federal court should take into account pragmatic considerations such as importance of the federal 
issue, need for federal court expertise, and potential increase in the federal caseload in deciding 
whether to assert federal question jurisdiction in an individual case.  Id. at 814 n.12; see also Cohen, 
supra note 7, at 905–08 (advocating a pragmatic approach to jurisdictional questions); David L. 
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direction: it announced that when Congress had not supplied a private, 
implied remedy for violation of a federal statute, that decision also 
carried with it the conclusion that the federal issue was “insufficiently 
‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”97  The dissent 
argued that Congress’s decision not to provide a private, implied right of 
action spoke not at all to the question of jurisdiction,98 and the 
commentators agreed.99 
Merrell Dow should have been a relatively easy case.  The result was 
correct.100  The analysis was flawed.  Several alternative analyses would 
have been simpler and superior.101  Perhaps the clearest evidence of the 
                                                                                                                                  
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 568 (1985) (discussing what courts 
should consider in determining jurisdiction). 
 97. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814. 
 98. Id. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 99. Citations to the many commentaries on Merrell Dow are collected in Alleva, supra note 20, 
at 1484 n.21 and Marshall, supra note 7, at 225 n.33, 227 n.44.  One critic charged the Court with 
confusing apples and oranges.  Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business 
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1769, 1790 (1992).  A better analogy might have been the closer cousins oranges and 
tangerines.  In both Merrell Dow and the implied remedies cases of the day (Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 
(1979)), the Court was concerned with the intent of Congress and the question of where power 
should reside.  See infra Part IV.A.3 (arguing the pragmatic approach to jurisdiction damages both 
state and congressional authority). 
 100. Even the author of the influential article first proposing the consideration of pragmatic 
standards in a decision on federal question jurisdiction stated flatly, that when federal law merely 
provided the standard of conduct in a state tort action, the case did not arise under federal law.  
Cohen, supra note 7, at 911.  Another leading commentator wrote of cases in which state law 
incorporated a federal standard, stating “I see no federal interest in hearing such controversies, and 
the statute could profitably and clearly be made to exclude them by requiring that federal law operate 
of its own force in order to support jurisdiction.”  David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the 
American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 277 (1969) (citation omitted). 
 101. First and foremost, the Court could have followed the American Well Works rule that the 
claim arose under state law.  As Justice Holmes wrote, “[t]he State is master of the whole matter.”  
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).  He later expanded on this 
thought, stating “[t]he whole foundation of the duty is [state] law, which at its sole will incorporated 
the other law as it might incorporate a document.  The other law or document depends for its 
relevance and effect not on its own force but upon the law that took it up . . . .”  Smith v. Kan. City 
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
Second, and as a corollary, all six counts of the complaints were pure state tort law.  See Merrell 
Dow, 478 U.S. at 805 (basing recovery on theories of “negligence, breach of warranty, strict 
liability, fraud, and gross negligence”).  Even Count IV pleaded the federal statute only because it 
supplied the duty element of the tort.  Id. at 805–07; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & 
KEETON ON TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 1984) (stating “[w]hen a statute provides that . . . acts shall or shall 
not be done,” it is negligent to deviate from this standard).  State negligence law was the entire 
substance of the count.  This analysis would have followed Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 
291 U.S. 205, 216–17 (1934), and the reasoning of Justice Holmes in both American Well Works and 
Smith. 
Third, the basic controversy sounded in state tort law, and the need to consider federal law was 
only “lurking in the background,” “collateral,” or “merely possible.”  This reasoning would have 
followed Justice Cardozo’s alternative analysis in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–
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flawed analysis of Merrell Dow was that it produced a three-way circuit 
conflict as the lower federal courts attempted to interpret and apply it.102  
The plurality of lower courts thought Merrell Dow meant a return to the 
rule of American Well Works: to say that no federal jurisdiction existed 
when Congress had not supplied a private, implied remedy was not far 
from saying that the claim arose under state law.103  To the extent that 
view was accurate, the question became why the Court did not return to 
the Holmes rule instead of continuing to plod along the complicated path 
to pragmatism. 
E. The Complicated Path Reaches Its Destination? 
In 2005, the Court decided Grable & Sons.  This decision is certainly 
the Court’s most recent word on jurisdiction over federal issues 
embedded in state law claims, and may also be the destination of the path 
                                                                                                                                  
18 (1936).  See supra notes 67, 70–71 and accompanying text (quoting Cardozo). 
Fourth, the Court could have pointed out that a federal statute supplying the negligence duty in 
one count of a six-count complaint is not a substantial federal question.  See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER 
& COOPER, supra note 2, § 3564, at 66 (stating “[n]ot every case ‘arising under’ federal law—is 
within federal question jurisdiction” because the federal claim must be substantial). 
Fifth, the Court could have looked to its recent declaration that a case can arise under federal 
law only “where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of 
federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983), 
superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633.  
Merrell Dow presented no occasion for “construction” of federal law; at the most, it called for an 
“application.”  Justice Brennan, in dissent, leaped past his own two-year-old opinion in Franchise 
Tax Board (“construction”) to reach back sixty-five years to “construction or application” found in 
Smith, 255 U.S. at 199.  See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the manipulation of language to extend 
federal jurisdiction). 
Sixth, the Court could have employed the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit that a claim supported 
by alternative theories did not support federal question jurisdiction unless federal law was essential 
to each of the theories.  See supra note 94 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Merrell Dow).  
The Court later adopted this reasoning in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 
800, 810 (1988).  See infra note 145 (quoting Christianson). 
Seventh, the Court could have discussed the plenary power of Congress over federal jurisdiction 
and recognized that the assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court over a state law claim usurped that 
power.  See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems resulting from the Court’s usurpation of 
congressional authority to define federal jurisdiction).  It also stripped the state courts of authority to 
decide state law.  See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the advantages of a rule that respects state court 
authority). 
 102. Circuit conflicts are common.  A three-way conflict is rare indeed.  Decisions are collected 
in Alleva, supra note 20, at 1532–38; Elizabeth Klein Frumkin, A Proposal for Resolving Lower-
Court Conflicts over Federal Question Jurisdiction, 85 ILL. B.J. 548, 550–53 (1997); and Brianna 
Fuller, Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1443, 1455–59 (2004).  The same 
type of fracturing can be seen in district court decisions.  See Marshall, supra note 7, at 231 n.60 
(citing several district court cases upholding federal jurisdiction and several remanding back to state 
court). 
 103. See Alleva, supra note 20, at 1531–32 n.195 (citing lower court cases where a lack of 
private federal action precluded federal jurisdiction). 
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the Court has been following away from a simple, elegant, and powerful 
rule toward a complicated, clumsy, and ad hoc rule. 
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized real property belonging 
to Grable & Sons for failure to pay taxes.104  The seizure was pursuant to 
a federal statute, which required notice “to the owner of the property [or] 
left at his usual place of abode or business.”105  The IRS served Grable & 
Sons by certified mail.106  Grable & Sons did not respond, and the IRS 
sold the property at a tax sale to the defendant, Darue.107  Five years 
passed before Grable & Sons sued Darue in Michigan state court to quiet 
title, claiming the IRS sale was invalid because the statute required 
personal service.108  Darue removed to federal court on the ground that 
the case required interpretation of the federal tax statute, and the court 
denied remand.109  The district court granted summary judgment to 
Darue, holding that service by certified mail satisfied the statute.110  The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.111  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
issue of federal question jurisdiction alone.112 
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice David Souter, is broken 
into three parts.  The first part creates a new, even more complicated, test 
for federal question jurisdiction in a state-created claim.113  The second 
part applies the facts of the case to the new test.114  The third part rejects 
arguments that the reasoning of Merrell Dow was tantamount to a return 
to the American Well Works rule.115 
The first part of Grable & Sons opens with the assertion that federal 
courts “ought” to be able to hear cases that include federal questions in 
                                                     
 104. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2366 (2005). 
 105. 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2000). 
 106. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2366. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (holding “substantial compliance with the statute was enough”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  The Supreme Court faced another hard case.  A decision that federal question 
jurisdiction did not exist would have rewarded the deadbeat corporation with the opportunity to 
begin anew in state court.  See infra Part III.D.2 (highlighting that development through hard cases 
leads to bad law in this area). 
 113. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368; see also infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text 
(discussing the first part of Grable & Sons’ analysis and the new rule created therein). 
 114. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368–69; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text 
(discussing the second part of Grable & Sons’ analysis). 
 115. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2369–71 (distinguishing Merrell Dow from the Holmes 
rule in Smith); see also infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing the third part of 
Grable & Sons’ analysis). 
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state law claims.116  The part posits eight Court precedents in support of 
its assertion; of those eight cases, five are of little value as they reject 
federal jurisdiction,117 and two are distinguishable on the facts.118  That 
leaves one precedent.  Once again, the trail leads back to Smith, and only 
to Smith.  The opinion fails to consider, or even mention, a half-dozen 
Court precedents directly on point and opposed to its finding of 
jurisdiction.119 
The first part of Grable & Sons culminates in the announcement of a 
pragmatic, four-prong test to be used in deciding whether a federal issue 
embedded in a state law claim can support “arising under”—federal 
question—jurisdiction.  “[T]he question is, does a state-law claim 
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, 
which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
                                                     
 116. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367.  The opinion relies on AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE 
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164–66 (1969).  The discussion 
there is of federal question jurisdiction in general.  The Court’s assertion forms an odd couple with 
the Court’s statement less than a page later that federal jurisdiction is subject to “congressional 
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts.”  Grable & Sons,  125 
S. Ct. at 2367; see also infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the effect of the American Well Works rule on 
the authority of state courts as compared to the pragmatic weighing test of Grable & Sons). 
 117. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988); Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633; Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936); 
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 571–72 (1912). 
 118. See City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (plaintiff’s claim was 
created by federal law even though it was raised pursuant to state administrative procedure); 
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 487 (1917) (plaintiff sued to quiet title to land obtained through 
federal grant); see also supra note 81 (discussing Hopkins). 
 119. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 210 (1934) (“The jurisdiction of the 
District Court is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint.”); People v. Russell & Co., 
288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933) (“[Federal jurisdiction] may not be invoked where the right asserted is 
non-Federal merely because the right to sue is derived from Federal law, or because the property 
involved was obtained under Federal statute.”); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 
U.S. 257, 259–60 (1916) (“A suit for damages to business caused by a threat to sue under the patent 
law is not in itself a suit under the patent law.”); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 
237 U.S. 300, 302–03 (1915) (stating jurisdiction does not depend entirely on diversity because the 
“suit arises under the laws of the United States”); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 
22, 25–26 (1913) (“[I]f the plaintiff really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress, there 
is jurisdiction . . . .”); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 207 U.S. 79, 86–88 (1907) 
(discussing constitutionality of a state statute); Miller’s Ex’rs v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132, 136–37 
(1893) (holding construction of a state statute presented no federal question); cf. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203 (1918) (“‘Cases arising under the laws of the United 
States are such that grow out of the legislation of Congress.’” (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 
257, 264 (1880))); see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing the jurisdiction rule in American Well 
Works and cases both preceding and following); infra notes 328–29 and accompanying text 
(discussing precedent that would or would not support a return to the American Well Works rule). 
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responsibilities.”120  While the first three elements, or at least the Court’s 
statement of the first three elements, of the test are each subject to 
criticism,121 the fourth element is the most remarkable. 
The Court here mandates that every time a federal court considers 
federal question jurisdiction over a federal issue embedded in a state 
claim, it must work through pragmatic considerations, such as a need for 
federal court expertise in the area of law, federal court solicitude for the 
federal interest, a need for uniformity in the law, and potential disruption 
of the division of jurisdiction between federal and state courts (which, 
apparently, equals too large an increase in the federal caseload).122  This 
four- or seven-element test is troubling for a host of reasons.123 
The second part of Grable & Sons applies the facts of the case to the 
test established in the first part.  Discussion here is minimal and hustles 
through the elements of the test.  Once quickly through the test, the 
application portion claims the applied result places Grable & Sons “in 
venerable company” with three prior quiet-title decisions—all of which 
are distinguishable.124 
                                                     
 120. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 121. First, the state claim must “necessarily” raise a federal issue.  None of the discussion in 
Grable & Sons supports this requirement.  Id. at 2368–71.  Justice Souter is apparently thinking back 
to language that first appeared in Franchise Tax Board.  See 463 U.S. at 9 (“We have often held that 
a case ‘arose under’ federal law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned 
on some construction of federal law.”). 
Second, the federal issue must be “actually disputed.”  Justice Souter appears to be borrowing 
from Gully v. First National Bank.  See 299 U.S. at 112–13 (stating “a genuine and present 
controversy” regarding a federal issue must exist).  The problem is that this requirement highlights 
the collision of Gully with the well-pleaded complaint rule.  See supra note 67 (discussing Gully). 
Third, the federal issue must be “substantial.”  This requirement is neither new nor 
objectionable, but the citation to Shultis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912), is odd because there the 
Court refused jurisdiction over a claim that was created under federal law.  Id. at 571–72. 
 122. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2370–71 (discussing the “careful consideration” called for 
by Merrell Dow).  The use of pragmatic considerations, such as impact on federal caseload, traces 
back to hints in Merrell Dow.  See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814–17 
(1986) (referencing “careful judgments” regarding jurisdiction and “management of the federal 
judicial system”); Cohen, supra note 7, at 905–08 (discussing “pragmatic standards” for the 
“pragmatic problem” of federal question jurisdiction); Shapiro, supra note 96, at 568–70 (stating any 
explanation of the variety of outcomes on federal question jurisdiction would need to accord 
“sufficient room for the federal courts to make a range of choices based on consideration of judicial 
administration and the degree of federal concern” (footnote omitted)); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 103 (5th ed. Supp. 2006) (suggesting the analysis in Grable & Sons “track[s] 
the approach advocated by Professor Shapiro”). 
 123. See infra Part III (discussing problems with the court’s new tests in Grable & Sons and 
cases leading up to it after American Well Works). 
 124. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368–69.  The prior decisions were all quiet-title cases, but the 
key difference is that in all three the source of plaintiff’s title was a federal grant.  See Hopkins v. 
Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 487 (1917) (stating that plaintiffs were owners of a placer mining claim for 
which a United States patent was issued); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo Y Marcos, 236 U.S. 635, 
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The third part of Grable & Sons, which is larger than the rest of the 
opinion combined, explains at length why Merrell Dow is not 
inconsistent with the result and did not represent a return to the American 
Well Works rule.125  Actually, this part never mentions American Well 
Works, the cases leading up to it, or the cases following it; instead, it 
seeks to diminish the so-called Holmes rule by recognizing only his 
dissent in Smith.126  Grable & Sons concludes that even after Merrell 
Dow, “Justice Holmes [is] still dissenting.”127  The part also raises the 
spectre of “overturning decades of precedent” by adopting the Holmes 
rule.128  Most of the discussion is a hindsight analysis showing why the 
result in Merrell Dow fits within the pragmatic test of Grable & Sons. 
Only Justice Clarence Thomas writes separately.129  He hints at a 
willingness to return to the American Well Works rule because 
jurisdictional rules should be clear, the rule covers the “‘vast majority’” 
of cases, and the small Smith category may not be worth the effort.130  In 
the end, he decides to await “better evidence as to the original meaning 
of § 1331’s text.”131  That better evidence is not likely to be 
forthcoming.132 
                                                                                                                                  
644 (1915) (discussing character of land grant as based on a treaty between Spain and the United 
States); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 528–29 (1903) (discussing mineral rights on 
land granted to railroad); see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing “construction of 
federal law” when federal land grants and quiet-title actions are involved).  Plaintiff’s title in Grable 
& Sons came from state property law.  125 S. Ct. at 2366. 
 125. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2369–71. 
 126. See id. at 2369 (“Merrell Dow cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent, as 
it would have done by effectively adopting the Holmes dissent in Smith . . . .”). 
 127. Id. at 2370. 
 128. Id. at 2369.  These decades of precedent amount to one case: Smith.  All of the cases 
preceding and succeeding Smith refused federal jurisdiction.  See supra Part II.C–D (discussing 
cases prior and subsequent to Smith).  The opinion does not show similar solicitude for the decades 
of precedent it ignored.  See supra note 119 (citing a multitude of case law ignored by the Court in 
Smith). 
 129. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The near unanimity of the 
Court should not be interpreted to mean that the law in the area is becoming settled.  Two examples 
suffice.  First, American Well Works (rejecting jurisdiction) was decided eight-to-one; five years 
later, Smith (upholding jurisdiction) was decided six-to-two; thirteen years after Smith, Moore v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 291 U.S. 205, 216 (1934) (rejecting jurisdiction) was unanimous.  
Second, Franchise Tax Board was unanimous; two years later, in Merrell Dow, the Court split five-
to-four.  Both rejected jurisdiction, but on completely different rationales. 
 130. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)); see also infra Part IV.A.1, .5 (arguing that 
the American Well Works rule works and draws a bright jurisdictional line). 
 131. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2371 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 132. Justice Felix Frankfurter has observed “[t]he history of archeology is replete with the 
unearthing of riches buried for centuries.  Our legal history does not, however, offer a single 
archeological discovery of new, revolutionary meaning in reading an old judiciary enactment.”  
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 370 (1959).  The succeeding half-century has 
not damaged that observation. 
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Such is the current state of the law in the area of federal question 
jurisdiction.  The next Part discusses problems in the Court’s work 
culminating in Grable & Sons.  Then, this Article weighs the arguments 
for and against a return to the American Well Works rule.133 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S WORK CULMINATING IN GRABLE & 
SONS 
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that a case 
arises under the law that creates the claim.134  Late in the century, 
through dicta, the Court moved away from the rule.135  Now, early in the 
twenty-first century, the Court has determined a federal court must work 
through a four- or seven-element test on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists over a federal 
issue embedded in a state law claim.136 
This Part identifies four major problems with this development of the 
law.  The result misallocates jurisdiction between state and federal 
courts, seizes power over federal jurisdiction at the expense of Congress,  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Commentators have found little, if any, guidance in the legislative history of the 1875 Act.  
Perhaps the fullest discussion of the history of the statute is found in an earlier book by the Justice 
himself.  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 28, at 65–68.  Additional attempts have been made.  
Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723 
(1986); Doernberg, supra note 20, at 603–04; Ray Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question”, 
16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 374–75 (1942); George B. Fraser, Jr., Some Problems in Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (1950).  Some commentators take the position that no 
history exists because the act is “‘sneak legislation,’” intentionally passed with no discussion so 
potential opponents would not realize what was in the bill.  Bergman, supra note 20, at 27 (quoting 
Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 642–45). 
Apparently the only snippet of history is the following statement of Senator Matthew H. 
Carpenter, on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to the effect that the act is intended to 
confer full constitutional authority: “This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution 
confers—nothing more, nothing less.”  2 CONG. REC. 4977, 4987 (1874).  Yet this isolated statement 
has been challenged as not referring to the grant of federal question jurisdiction, but instead referring 
to the 1875 Act as a whole, Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 160 n.22 (1953), or referring to service of process, Alleva, supra note 20, at 
1493 n.46. 
A look backwards to the origins of federal question jurisdiction in the Constitution, and in the 
decision of the first Congress not to grant such jurisdiction to the federal courts, also sheds no light 
on the decision of Congress in 1875.  See generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some 
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998). 
 133. See infra Part IV. 
 134. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 135. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808–09; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 
463 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
336, 100 Stat. 633. 
 136. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. 
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runs counter to the overwhelming trend of federal jurisdiction, and 
amounts to no more than formless equity.137 
A. Cases After American Well Works Leading to the Misallocation of 
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Grable & Sons 
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction Exists over Cases, Not Issues 
Article III extends federal jurisdiction to “all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”138  
“Cases” appears to refer to an entire case, not a single or isolated issue.  
“Arising under” appears to refer to a case that arises initially under 
federal authority, not one that arises initially under state authority.  The 
drafting history in the Constitutional Convention supports those 
meanings.139 
These carefully chosen words and their intended meanings should 
not be ignored.  The assumption has always been “that, in dealing with a 
subject as technical as the jurisdiction of the courts, the Framers, 
predominantly lawyers, used precise, differentiating and not redundant 
language.”140 
                                                     
 137. See infra Part III.A–D. 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 139. See generally Liebman & Ryan, supra note 132.  Liebman and Ryan also discuss “all 
Cases.”  See id. at 736 (Supreme Court to “decide whole disputes, not abstract issues”); id. at 742 
(“[The case includes the] whole such dispute rather than just the part of it involving the ‘federal’ (or 
equivalent) question.”); id. at 746 n.244 (addition of “in Law and Equity” meant to exclude idea that 
“abstract legal issues could generate federally cognizable ‘arising under’ cases”); id. at 771 (“By 
‘case,’ we mean a court action that can be resolved on the basis of enforceable law.”). 
The prior drafts of the provision that in the end became the famous “arising under” language are 
instructive.  An early draft extended jurisdiction to “‘collection of the National revenue . . . and 
questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.’”  Id. at 712 (quoting THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand]).  A later 
draft replaced “National revenue” cases with “‘cases arising under laws passed by the general 
Legislature.’”  Id. at 732 (quoting Farrand, supra, at 39).  This language evolved into “‘all Cases 
arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of the United States.’”  Id. at 740 (quoting Farrand, 
supra, at 172–73).  Drafters later added cases arising under “‘this Constitution,’” “‘in Law and 
Equity,’” and provisions regarding treaties, and deleted “‘passed by the Legislature.’”  Id. at 746–47 
(quoting same).  The purpose was to conform the language of the Jurisdiction Clause to the language 
of the Supremacy Clause.  Id.  The editing out of the specific reference to laws passed by the 
national legislature does not seem to change the transparent intent to refer to national laws. 
 140. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 364 (1959) superseded by statute on 
other grounds, Jones Act, ch. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291, as recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 
498 U.S. 19 (1990); see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 132, at 722 n.129 (quoting Representative 
Stone’s discussion of the Framers’ intent with the language used in describing the courts’ 
jurisdiction). 
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The drafters understood “[c]ases . . . arising under” jurisdiction to 
encompass a discrete and clearly identifiable class of cases: cases 
actually created by federal law, whether through Constitution, statute, or 
treaty.  The same understanding almost certainly carried through to the 
“actions . . . arising under” language employed in drafting the 1875 
Act.141  That understanding was shared by all of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court culminating in American Well Works.142  It was stated 
most forcefully in the following words: 
[A] suit cannot be said to arise under any other law than that which 
creates the cause of action.  It may be enough that the law relied upon 
creates a part of the cause of action although not the whole, as held in 
Osborn . . . .  I am content to assume this to be so, although the Osborn 
Case has been criticized and regretted.  But the law must create at least 
a part of the cause of action by its own force, for it is the suit, not a 
question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United 
States.143 
Disappearance of the understanding that federal question jurisdiction 
applies to cases, not to issues, provides much of the explanation for the 
confusion created by the two most recent Supreme Court decisions in 
this area of the law. 
The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow pleaded six counts in their complaint.  
Count IV pleaded that a federal statute supplied the duty element of the 
                                                     
 141. “Certainly the accomplished lawyers who drafted the Act of 1875 drew on the language of 
the constitutional grant on the assumption that they were dealing with a distinct class of cases . . . .”  
Romero, 358 U.S. at 366–67. 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 39 (stating “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the 
cause of action”).  One of the clearest statements is found in Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 
168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897), in which the Court was dealing with the related question of whether 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases had deprived the state court of jurisdiction.  The 
Court rationalized as follows: 
Section 711 does not deprive the state courts of the power to determine questions arising 
under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of “cases” arising under those 
laws.  There is a clear distinction between a case and a question arising under the patent 
laws.  The former arises when the plaintiff in his opening pleading . . . sets up a right 
under the patent laws as a ground for a recovery. 
Id. 
 143. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214–15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).  One commentator noted as follows: 
The dominant trend of the cases through Gully v. First National Bank . . . makes clear 
that it is never enough, for purposes of the jurisdictional statute (as contrasted with 
Article III of the Constitution), that a case involves one or more incidental questions 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, if the plaintiff’s cause of 
action itself was not created by federal law. 
London, supra note 62, at 853. 
MCFARLAND FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:37:19 PM 
2006] THE TRUE COMPASS 25 
tort of negligence.144  At most, that is a federal issue; it is not a “case” or 
“action” that arises under federal law.145 
The Court’s most recent word is Grable & Sons.  To quiet title, the 
plaintiff pleaded both the source of its title and the source of defendant’s 
title.146  Going another step, plaintiff pleaded that its title was superior to 
the defendant’s, namely because the defendant’s title was obtained 
through a federal tax sale based on improper service under the federal 
statute.147  Finally, the complaint reached the federal issue.148  The aroma 
was clearly like that of a federal issue arising in defense, but, even 
granting that the federal statute was properly part of the well-pleaded 
complaint, we certainly had the pleading of a federal issue, not a federal 
“case” or “action.” 
2. Misunderstanding of “Cause of Action” and “Claim” 
Part of the difficulty in recognizing that “arising under” jurisdiction 
applies to cases, not to issues, is caused by the misunderstanding and 
misuse of “cause of action” and “claim.”  The history of pleading in state 
and federal courts, to the extent necessary to recognize this difficulty, 
will be recounted here in summary fashion. 
At common law, the right/duty relationship between the wronged 
person and the wrongdoer created a “right of action.”149  The claimant 
                                                     
 144. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the allegation in Count IV). 
 145. A variant of the same analysis could have been that the “case” or “action” did not 
encompass a federal question, because the plaintiff could well have prevailed on one of the other 
five counts.  This analysis traces back to Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).  
Recently, the Court applied this type of analysis.  Rejecting exclusive appeal to the Federal Circuit in 
a patent case, the Court wrote as follows: 
Nor is it necessarily sufficient that a well-pleaded claim alleges a single theory under 
which resolution of a patent-law question is essential.  If “on the face of a well-pleaded 
complaint there are . . . reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of 
[the patent laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks,” then 
the claim does not “arise under” those laws.  Thus, a claim supported by alternative 
theories in the complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent 
law is essential to each of those theories. 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (citations omitted).  This 
analysis brings to mind the proper understanding of pleading a “claim.”  See infra Part III.A.2 
(discussing the confusion between a “cause of action” and a “claim”). 
 146. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2366, 2368 
(2005). 
 147. Id. at 2368. 
 148. Id. 
 149. “[W]hen a legal right is wrongfully infringed, there accrues to the injured party a right to 
obtain a legal remedy, by action against the wrongdoer.  This secondary or remedial right is called a 
right of action.”  GEORGE L. PHILLIPS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CODE PLEADING § 
186, at 168 (Percival W. Viesselman ed., Callaghan & Company 1932) (1896); see also Charles E. 
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pleaded this right of action in a “form of action.”150  A form of action, as 
well as other aspects of common-law pleading, became increasingly 
complex, creating calls for reform. 
That reform came in code pleading.  Common-law pleading of a 
form of action was replaced by the simplified code pleading of a “cause 
of action.”151  The cause of action, in turn, created unexpected pleading 
complexities.  One was that courts and commentators were unable to 
agree on the definition of a cause of action.152  Some equated the cause of 
action to the right of action, a single intersection of right/duty, i.e., a 
single legal theory of recovery.153  Others maintained the cause of action 
was something new: a single grouping of facts that a lay observer would 
expect to be tried together without regard to any number of legal theories 
of recovery that might be chunked into those facts.154 
To illustrate the relevance of the problem of defining a cause of 
action, we can consider the facts of Merrell Dow.  Each plaintiff, injured 
by ingestion of defendant’s drug Bendectin, sued in state court on six 
theories of recovery: negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, 
fraud, negligence of misbranding in violation of federal statute, and gross 
negligence.155  How many causes of action did each plaintiff plead?  Six,  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 823–24 (1933) (describing the difference 
between cause of action and right of action); O. L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 
YALE L.J. 614, 617 (1925) (stating “[t]he unstated facts give a ‘right of action,’ but the stated facts 
give a ‘cause of action.’”). 
 150. The common forms of action were trespass, (trespass on the) case, debt, detinue, replevin, 
trover, ejectment, covenant, account, and assumpsit.  ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 526–29 (2003). 
 151. See Clark, supra note 149, at 820 (“The phrase ‘cause of action’ did not become a term of 
art in the law of pleading until the adoption of the code.”). 
 152. See id. at 823 (stating “[t]he definitions of the term by text writers and courts have been 
numerous and discordant”). 
 153. “[T]he primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of 
action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is used in the codes of the several states.”  JOHN N. 
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 347 (4th ed. 1904).  “It is that group of operative facts which, standing 
alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for the 
state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties whose right was invaded.”  McCaskill, 
supra note 149, at 638. 
 154. The cause of action was “such a group of facts . . . limited as a lay onlooker would to a 
single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the resulting legal right or rights.”  
CHARLES E. CLARK, CLARK ON CODE PLEADING § 19, at 130 (2d ed. 1947).  The same author also 
gave the following definition: 
The cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts 
which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons.  The 
size of such aggregate should be worked out in each case pragmatically with an idea of 
securing convenient and efficient dispatch of trial business. 
Clark, supra note 149, at 837. 
 155. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–06 (1986). 
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say those who define cause of action in terms of legal theory.  One, say 
those who define cause of action in terms of an aggregate of facts. 
In part because of difficulty in defining cause of action, another 
wave of procedural reform swept the country.  When the Supreme Court 
appointed an advisory committee to draft the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the reporter was Dean, later Judge, Charles E. Clark.  As the 
leading proponent of the fact-aggregate school of thought on cause of 
action, he made sure that the Federal Rules embodied his view by 
omitting “cause of action” entirely from the rules.156  Instead, a claimant 
under the rules was to plead a “short and plain statement of the claim,” 
commonly known as a “claim.”157  The cause of action thus became 
obsolete—or should have become obsolete—in the federal courts and the 
majority of states that became rules states.  The “claim” embodied 
Clark’s understanding of a set of facts that formed a convenient litigation 
unit.158 
Understanding this history and the philosophy of the Federal Rules 
makes the answer to the earlier question quite clear.  Each plaintiff in 
Merrell Dow had one claim: all theories of recovery coalesced around 
the single fact that the person had ingested Bendectin.159 
In sum, a plaintiff in federal court or a rules state pleads a claim for 
relief, which is a transactional grouping of facts that may give rise to one 
or more legal theories of recovery.  No matter how many theories of 
recovery, a plaintiff has one claim on one related, aggregate set of 
facts.160  Today, in code states, a plaintiff still pleads a cause of action; 
                                                     
 156. CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 658 (1940) (citing Collins v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1939) (Clark, J., concurring)); Arthur J. 
Keeffe et al., Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV. 569, 610 
(1952). 
 157. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 158. Clark commented as follows on the new “claim”: 
These rules make the extent of the claim involved depend not upon legal rights, but upon 
the facts, that is, upon a lay view of the past events which have given rise to the litigation.  
Such lay view of a transaction or occurrence, the subject matter of a claim, is not a 
precise concept; its outer limits should depend to a considerable extent upon the purpose 
for which the concept is being immediately used. 
CLARK, supra note 156, at 659. 
 159. 478 U.S. at 804. 
 160. Understanding the fact-based, transactional nature of a claim is important throughout the 
federal rules and federal jurisdictional statutes.  Kinship of the “claim” to the commonly encountered 
“transaction or occurrence” is apparent.  Cf. supra note 154 (describing a single occurrence).  Some 
examples are 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (supplemental jurisdiction extends over entire 
constitutional “case”); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000) (removal of separate and independent claim); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is compulsory); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (district court allowed to certify appeal only in case of multiple, i.e., factually 
discrete, claims). 
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yet, also in those states, the better understanding remains the Clark view 
of the grouping of facts that form a convenient litigation unit, not each 
legal theory of recovery. 
To the extent that terminology is necessary for a separate legal 
theory of recovery in either rules states or code states, the historically 
correct reference is right of action.  Alternatively, a pleader can be said 
to state a single claim—or single cause of action—containing multiple 
theories of recovery, or counts. 
Why this excursion into the history of pleading?  The reason is that 
the Supreme Court, in its recent decisions in the area of a federal issue 
embedded in a state law claim, has not taken account of the development 
of pleading law.  In Franchise Tax Board, the plaintiff pleaded one 
claim—one cause of action—since both counts arose out of the same set 
of facts, yet the Court discussed two causes of action.161  Perhaps the 
Court’s language was somewhat understandable because the case was 
removed from California, a code-pleading state.  Much less 
understandable was Merrell Dow, in which each plaintiff pleaded one 
claim (a single injury), yet the district court approved the removal from 
state court because “Count IV of the complaint alleged a cause of action 
arising under federal law,” and the Court ultimately concluded “a 
complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state 
cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no 
private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 
‘arising under.’”162 
The upshot is that reference to multiple causes of action makes the 
federal aspect of the case appear far more weighty than it is.  
Consideration of Count IV as a separate “cause of action arising under 
federal law” makes the federal interest appear substantial.163  Proper 
reference to Count IV as one of six theories of recovery on a single claim 
makes clear the federal tail is attempting to wag the state dog, and 
recognition that all six counts of the claim are created by state law 
diminishes the federal interest to the vanishing point.  The same type of 
tail wagging is likely to occur in the future as lower courts attempt to 
weigh the strength of the federal interest against the strength of the state 
interest pursuant to the test announced in Grable & Sons. 
                                                     
 161. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983), superseded 
by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633. 
 162. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 806, 817 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 806. 
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3. Resulting Misallocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal 
Courts 
Overvaluation of the federal interest in a case occurs because a court 
does not look at the case as a whole and does not recognize a single 
claim encompasses multiple legal theories of recovery.164  Recognition of 
this overvaluation leads to the further recognition that Grable & Sons 
will inevitably result in misallocation of jurisdiction between state and 
federal courts. 
The drafters of the Constitution intended for state courts to be not 
only the sole authority over state law but also primary protectors of 
federal rights under the compulsion of the Supremacy Clause and the 
correcting power of the Supreme Court.165  Grable & Sons invites federal 
courts to take cases created by state law based on an amorphous 
weighing of any federal interest that might be lurking somewhere in the 
crevices of the complaint.  In effect, the invitation is to “cut into” the 
jurisdiction of the state courts.166 
This approach fails to take into account the state’s interest in its own 
law.  Instead of following traditional doctrine that allows and encourages 
the state to determine its own law, the test of Grable & Sons, by 
allowing—encouraging—federal courts to assert jurisdiction, means that 
all aspects of the case will be decided by a federal court even though a 
lone federal issue may be nestled amongst many state law issues.167 
Federal courts deciding state law is worse than state courts deciding 
federal law.  One prominent reason is the federal court prediction of state 
law is not authoritative and may result in embarrassment should the state 
                                                     
 164. See supra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing jurisdiction and the difference between a “cause of 
action” and a “claim”). 
 165. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401–02 (1953) (stating state courts protect 
constitutional rights and limit the Supreme Court’s power); see also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 
132, at 747 (“The Framers thus self-consciously and irrevocably forged the constitutional structural 
link between the front-line decisionmaking of ‘the Judges in every State’ under the supremacy clause 
and the supervisory decisionmaking of the federal judiciary when called upon to exercise the ‘arising 
under’ jurisdiction permitted by the judiciary article.”); id. at 767, 778–79 n.375, 883 (discussing the 
Framers’ jurisdictional choices). 
 166. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380 (1959); see also Pratt v. Paris 
Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (state courts would be “ousted” of jurisdiction). 
 167. The authority of a federal court to determine all aspects of a case over which it has taken 
jurisdiction traces back to Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).  The 
actual case, however, may be much weightier with state ingredients, which should be determined by 
the state courts.  Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 218 (1948). 
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court ignore the prediction.168  A second prominent reason is federal 
courts are much more concerned with erroneously exercising jurisdiction 
than with erroneously declining jurisdiction.169 
The end result of Grable & Sons is that the federal court is now 
instructed to look for federal issues, not federal “cases” or federal 
“claims.”  This overweening concern for any glimmer of federal interest 
can only result in more state law cases commenced in, or removed to, 
federal courts.  That is a misallocation of jurisdiction between state and 
federal courts. 
B. Usurping Congressional Power over Federal Jurisdiction 
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction.  They can adjudicate only 
cases and controversies within the jurisdiction extended by Article III 
and granted by Congress.170  Such propositions are basic and 
noncontroversial. 
A slightly different way of saying the same thing is to point out “the 
Constitution assigns to Congress primary authority for control of federal 
jurisdiction.”171  Congress exercises this authority when it passes 
jurisdictional statutes.  While courts must interpret these jurisdictional 
statutes, a federal court must not create jurisdiction for itself under the 
guise of interpretation.172  Jurisdictional statutes are limited extensions of 
the jurisdiction the Constitution allows.  They are not springboards for 
extending jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Court invariably interprets 
                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950) (stating that 
erroneously deciding a doubtful local law could embarrass a federal court). 
 169. Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 
323 (1993).  See id. at 323 nn.282–83 (listing examples supporting this generally accepted 
proposition); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (prohibiting collusive joinder to establish federal 
jurisdiction but silent on collusive joinder to defeat federal jurisdiction). 
 170. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 171. Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.4 (1990) (collecting sources supporting this proposition). 
 172. One way of stating this proposition is to recognize “nothing in our history or traditions 
permits a court to interpret a normal grant of jurisdiction as conferring unbridled authority to hear 
cases simply at its pleasure.”  Shapiro, supra note 96, at 575. 
A few commentators have argued the Supreme Court should share in defining federal 
jurisdiction.  One writes of a “dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial response.”  
Friedman, supra note 171, at 2.  Another writes of the “jurisdictional collaboration” between 
Congress and Court, complains of the Court’s “troublesome abdication,” and argues to preserve “the 
judiciary’s front-line prerogative in hybrid claim determinations.”  Alleva, supra note 20, at 1525, 
1559.  These commentators’ views are contrary to accepted understanding, however.  The former 
admits the “congressional control approach” has widespread acceptance.  Friedman, supra note 171, 
at 2.  In addition, even these two commentators do not go so far as to assert that the Court should 
take the initiative in creating jurisdiction for itself. 
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jurisdictional statutes narrowly both in deference to Congress and in 
recognition of the limited jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.173 
A third way of approaching the same subject is to ask this question: 
Where does jurisdictional power reside?  The answer is Congress.174  
Power over federal jurisdiction is finite.  Like a zero-sum game, when 
one player gains power, another must lose it.  To the extent the Supreme 
Court—or any lower federal court—intrudes upon congressional 
authority to grant federal jurisdiction, it usurps the power of Congress. 
That seems to be the understanding the Court’s opinion in Merrell 
Dow was groping towards.  The opinion infelicitously theorized that, 
because Congress had not intended to create a private remedy for the 
federal regulatory statute, it must also have intended that no federal 
jurisdiction should exist.175  That link was hard to forge.  The Court 
would have done better to point out that, because Congress had not seen 
fit to extend federal jurisdiction to a case with a federal issue embedded 
in a state law claim, it would not intrude upon the plenary power of 
Congress over federal jurisdiction. 
The Merrell Dow Court did hint that pragmatic factors such as the 
“nature of the federal issue” and judicial economy might be considered 
in defining federal question jurisdiction, but carefully placed that 
suggestion into a footnote, not the text.176  More than hint would have 
been inappropriate, for such considerations “have much more to do with 
judicial administration than with any congressional command concerning 
when to exercise federal question jurisdiction.”177 
The Court was not so reticent in Grable & Sons.  Moving from 
footnote to text, and from hint to holding, the Court announced federal 
question jurisdiction over a case presenting a federal issue embedded in a 
state law claim is to be determined by a multifactor test of pragmatic 
considerations.178  The Court cast this pragmatic, weighing test as a rule 
of law.179  It is not.  It is a self-grant of discretion—discretion to 
                                                     
 173. See infra Part III.C (explaining that expansive interpretation is contrary to jurisdictional 
decisions). 
 174. See supra notes 1–2, 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 175. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson 478 U.S. 804, 810–17 (1986); see also supra notes 
97–99 and accompanying text. 
 176. 478 U.S. at 814 n.12. 
 177. Friedman, supra note 171, at 23. 
 178. “[D]oes a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). 
 179. A commentator who writes in the area of rules and norms identifies the following 
technique: 
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determine whether the federal issue is “necessarily raise[d],” 
“substantial,” and not “disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance.”180  The more discretion in the test, the more power that is 
vested in the federal court; the more power in the court, the less in 
Congress.  Consequently, the Court is usurping jurisdictional power from 
Congress. 
C. Expansive Interpretation Is Contrary to the Trend of Jurisdictional 
Decisions 
Federal question jurisdiction was first extended to the federal courts 
in 1875.181  From 1875 to the present day, the overwhelming general 
trend of federal jurisdiction—federal question and diversity, original, and 
removal—has been contraction through the efforts of both Congress and 
the Supreme Court.182 
Specifically with regard to cases embedding a federal issue in a state 
law claim, the early cases coalescing in American Well Works were in 
line with this trend.  Smith was contrary, but it stood alone.183  After 
American Well Works and Smith, the Court’s opinions expressed a 
willingness to expand federal jurisdiction in this area, but only in dictum 
as it decided against expansion in the actual case.184 
                                                                                                                                  
[T]here will often be a great tactical advantage, for a court which wants to expand its 
power at the expense of another institution, in casting the norms it wants to impose in the 
rule form. . . . There are two different ways in which the rule form shores up the 
legitimacy of judicial action.  First, the discretionary elements in the choice of a norm to 
impose are obscured by the process of justification that pops a rule out of the hat of 
policy, precedent, the text of the Constitution, or some other source of law.  Second, once 
the norm has been chosen, the rule form disguises the discretionary element involved in 
applying it to cases. 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1708 
(1976); see also infra Part IV.B.4 (arguing jurisdictional decisions should be based on straight-
forward rules rather than overly complex standards). 
 180. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.  One way of looking at the test of Grable & Sons is to 
identify it as a norm instead of a rule of law.  See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the relationship 
between norms, rules, and standards).  Another way of looking at the test is to identify it as formless 
equity.  See infra Part III.D (arguing the test in Grable & Sons is “pure equity” and allows decision 
based on “a personal sense of fairness”). 
 181. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470; see also supra Part II.A (explaining 
the history of the 1875 Act). 
 182. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1950); FRANKFURTER 
& LANDIS, supra note 28, at 69–145, 187–216, 255–94. 
 183. See supra Part II.C. 
 184. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (acknowledging 
that federal issues may arise in state law claims but finding no federal issue at the core of the case); 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983), superseded by statute, 
Judical Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633 (acknowledging federal 
jurisdiction over state law claims exists if “plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution 
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Only in Grable & Sons has the Court, for a second time, upheld 
federal question jurisdiction over a claim created by state law.185  
Because the holding is contrary to the trend narrowing federal 
jurisdiction, one would think some strong policy must support the 
decision; yet, the Court relies only on “the commonsense notion that a 
federal court ought to be able to hear [such] claims” because of the 
generic justifications for federal question jurisdiction—experience, 
sympathetic treatment, and uniformity.186  These generic justifications 
have little application in the situation of a federal issue embedded in a 
state law claim.187  One is left wondering why the Court is working so 
hard to mine the ounce of federal-question pure metal from the ton of 
state-law ore, especially given the fact that the overwhelming trend of 
statutes and cases narrows federal jurisdiction. 
D. The Cases Result in Formless Equity, Not a Rule of Law 
Both because jurisdiction equals power and because of the limited 
nature of that federal power, the federal judiciary has always been 
scrupulously careful to respect precise constitutional and statutory grants 
of—and limits on—its power.188  These provisions have produced 
understandable, uniform, precise, certain, and stable jurisdictional rules. 
This is not so in Grable & Sons.  In deciding whether federal 
jurisdiction exists, lower federal courts must now use four pragmatic 
                                                                                                                                  
of a substantial question of federal law”); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936) 
(requiring that an issue of federal law actually be contested within a state law claim for federal 
jurisdiction to exist); cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) 
(holding that, as relief could foreseeably be granted on nonfederal law grounds, the Federal Circuit 
did not have jurisdiction). 
 185. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2363.  Compare City of Chicago v. International College of 
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), another recent case approving federal question jurisdiction in the 
context of a state administrative appeal proceeding. 
 186. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 187. See infra Part IV.B.2–3 (discussing two of the original justifications for federal jurisdiction, 
state hostility to federal laws and the expertise of federal judges on federal law issues, as they apply 
to state law claims). 
 188. Several examples come quickly to mind.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 
S. Ct. 2611, 2641 (2005) (holding that plain language of supplemental jurisdiction statute overrules 
earlier cases requiring every member of a diversity class to satisfy amount in controversy 
requirement); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 207 (1990) (stating that limited partners’ 
citizenship must be considered for diversity); Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9 (1951) 
(stating that removal statute requires “separate and independent” claim); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. 
v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106–07 (1941) (discussing statute allowing only a “defendant” to remove); 
Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894) (holding the federal question must 
appear in a well-pleaded complaint); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) 
(finding the allegation of citizenship of parties defective); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
267, 267 (1806) (holding federal jurisdiction requires complete diversity). 
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considerations: necessity, actual dispute, substantiality, and federal 
caseload impact.189  Even four considerations are not enough.  In 
assessing these four factors, the court is also told to consider need for 
federal expertise over the subject, need for sympathetic treatment of the 
federal issue, and need for uniformity of federal law in the individual 
case.190 
Any weighing test, whether seven- or four-factor, is an aberration 
amongst federal jurisdictional decisions.191  It is inappropriate for 
jurisdictional decisions.192  It is at best a standard instead of a rule of 
law.193  It is in reality no more than pure equity, with the federal 
chancellor standing at the gate to decide based on a personal sense of 
fairness whether a case shall enter. 
1. Manipulation of Language to Extend Federal Jurisdiction 
The equitable nature of the cases culminating in Grable & Sons can 
also be seen by examining the opinions.  What becomes apparent is that 
the Justices manipulate language to achieve results they find equitable. 
The first interpretations of the “arising under” language of Article III 
established that a federal question case must require “construction” of the 
federal provision.194  The first interpretations of the nearly identical 
“arising under” language of the federal question statute largely relied on 
                                                     
 189. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368; see also supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text 
(discussing the inefficiency of the four-part test in Grable & Sons). 
 190. Id. at 2367. 
 191. See supra note 188 (referring to cases limiting federal jurisdiction); infra Part IV.A.5 
(discussing the advantages of a “bright-line rule” in jurisdictional determinations). 
 192. “Delicate questions which turn on a large cluster of factors are unsuited to be questions of 
power.”  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 314 (1950).  “A vague, intuitive 
‘federal interests’ test is an escape, not an answer.  The jurisdictional grants do not invite ad hoc 
assessments of ‘pragmatic need.’  Rather, they condition federal jurisdiction on objective 
circumstances.”  Note, The Outer Limits of “Arising Under”, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978, 980–81 
(1979); see also infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of simple rules 
for determining federal jurisdiction); infra Part IV.A.5 (discussing the advantages of a “bright-line 
rule” in jurisdictional determinations). 
 193. The test arising from Grable & Sons shares none of the favorable characteristics of rules of 
law, such as neutrality, uniformity, precision, certainty, efficiency, exactingness, or stability.  
Instead, the positives of the test could be said to be flexibility, individualization, creativity, and 
equity, which are the favorable characteristics of standards.  Kennedy, supra note 179, at 1710; see 
also infra Part IV.B.4. 
 194. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824), superseded by statute, 
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1349, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (“[T]he title or right set up by the party, may 
be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the 
opposite construction . . . .”); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821) (“A 
case in law or equity . . . may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United 
States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either.”). 
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the same requirement of “construction,” although some referred to 
“construction or effect” of the federal law.195  This slightly looser 
language was an expansion without a difference, as the cases using it did 
not rely on the addition to support jurisdiction. 
The next version of the test for federal question jurisdiction was 
“validity, construction or effect.”196  This also was more likely loose 
writing than intentional broadening, as the decision was against 
jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, at the time of American Well Works, the law required 
that a case present a question of “construction,” or perhaps “validity, 
construction or effect,” of a federal provision in order to support federal 
question jurisdiction.  This limitation both assured the centrality of the 
federal question in the case and called upon all the traditional 
justifications for a federal court decision: expertise, sympathetic hearing, 
and uniformity.197 
The first sleight of hand trick was performed, not surprisingly, in 
Smith.  The opinion stated the “general rule” as “the right to relief 
depends upon the construction or application” of federal law.198  The 
plaintiff brought a shareholders’ derivative suit to enjoin the directors of 
the company from breaching their state corporation law fiduciary duty to 
the corporation by investing in federal farm bonds.199  No “construction” 
of federal law yet.  The only federal issue entered the case upon 
following the plaintiff’s argument to the next step—that the reason the 
investment would breach the fiduciary duty was because the federal 
statute authorizing the bonds was unconstitutional.200  Critics might have 
questioned a rationale that the case therefore depended on “construction” 
of the Constitution.  No one could question that the case involved an 
“application” of federal law by state corporation law.201 
                                                     
 195. The first interpretation in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203–04 (1877) 
mentioned “construction” several times before concluding that the suit was not one that depended on 
“construction or effect” of federal law.  Some cases followed this “construction or effect” language.  
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 528 (1903); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 
505, 509 (1900); Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36, 37 (1889); R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 
140 (1880).  Others held fast to “construction.”  E.g., Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 
U.S. 454, 460 (1894); Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885). 
 196. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).  The Court used the same test five years 
later in Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 489 (1917), but the reference was dictum contained in a 
general statement of federal question law. 
 197. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 198. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at 195. 
 200. Id. at 198. 
 201. One might question whether a case calling for application, instead of construction, of 
federal law calls upon the same traditional justifications for federal question jurisdiction of federal 
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Even though later cases returned to the narrower, earlier test,202 this 
expanded criterion of “construction or application” asserted its influence 
over the decades.  It was accepted by the Supreme Court itself,203 and 
necessarily by lower federal courts.204 
This development leads to the first of the “modern” cases, Franchise 
Tax Board.  The opinion of the Court, written by Justice William J. 
Brennan, rules against jurisdiction, yet looks to future cases with a great 
deal of expansionary language.  The first pass at the test mentions only 
“construction.”205  The second pass suggests “correctness and the 
applicability,” or “meaning or application.”206  The third and final effort 
settles on the test that the “plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends 
on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”207  Franchise Tax 
Board thus provides opportunities for manipulation of language in the 
next case. 
That decision is Merrell Dow.  One of the plaintiffs’ six theories of 
recovery is the tort of negligence, with a federal statute supplying the 
duty element.208  Clearly, this usage can be characterized as an 
“application” of federal law by state tort law, but the usage in no sense 
requires “construction” of federal law. 
The opinion of the Court, rejecting jurisdiction, written by Justice 
John Paul Stevens, states the test is satisfied if “vindication of a right 
under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal 
law.”209  That is not remarkable.  What is remarkable is that Justice 
                                                                                                                                  
expertise, uniformity, and sympathetic treatment. 
 202. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (“construction or effect”); Moore 
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 213 (1934) (“scope or construction”). 
 203. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) 
(“interpretation or application”); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 272–73 (1944) (“[W]e 
unanimously applied the reasoning of the Kansas City Title case that where a decision under state 
law necessarily involves the construction or validity of federal law the determination of such federal 
law in the application of state law gives rise to a federal question for review here.”). 
 204. Some of the lower courts added their own embroidery to the test.  For example, Judge 
Henry Friendly, after recognizing the “meaning or application” test, proceeded to state a claim 
“arises under” when it requires “construction . . . or . . . perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case 
where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the 
claim.”  T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827–28 (2d Cir. 1964); see also supra note 80. 
 205. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983), superseded by 
statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633.  Oddly, the opinion 
cites Smith, the case that had expanded the test, for this earlier, narrower test. 
 206. Id.  For these broader tests, the opinion cites only a casebook for the first and a lower court 
opinion, T. B. Harms Co., for the second.  Oddly again, this is where the opinion could well have 
cited Smith. 
 207. Id. at 28.  The third oddity is the opinion cites no authority at all for this test. 
 208. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805 (1986). 
 209. Id. at 808. 
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Stevens quotes the first pass at the test from Franchise Tax Board.210  
The opinion notes, in a lengthy footnote, that the test comes from Smith, 
but ignores the fact that Franchise Tax Board had quoted the Smith test 
badly in the first pass, leaving out the crucial words “or application.”211  
The opinion also ignores the fact that later, in the Franchise Tax Board 
opinion, the Court had expanded the test greatly.212  Of course, the first-
pass language quoted is the most convenient for rejecting jurisdiction. 
In the same fashion, the dissent by Justice Brennan leaps past his 
own three-year-old Franchise Tax Board opinion to quote the test 
directly from Smith: the plaintiffs’ “right to relief depend[ed] upon the 
construction or application.”213  In doing so, the dissent not only invokes 
the more helpful, broader test of “construction or application,” but also 
omits the less helpful, troublesome word “necessarily” that Justice 
Brennan himself had inserted into the third-pass test in Franchise Tax 
Board.214 
After Merrell Dow, the Court continues to massage the test.  It relies 
entirely on the third-pass test from Franchise Tax Board when it 
concludes that a plaintiff’s claim requires “resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.”215  Finally, in Grable & Sons, the Court casts all 
of this language aside in favor of a multifactor, pragmatic test for federal 
question jurisdiction.216 
Recent cases loosen language and add pragmatic considerations, 
either through sloppy writing or stealthy manipulation.  One does not 
                                                     
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at 809 n.9 (discussing the origin of the test and the effects of the view points 
expressed in Smith). 
 212. See id. at 808–09, 813–14 (discussing the application of the test in Franchise Tax Board). 
 213. Id. at 823 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 
180, 199 (1921)).  The opinion references Franchise Tax Board after a “see also” citation; the 
reference, however, is not to the Smith discussion there, but instead to the third test proposed.  See 
supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting that the Franchise Tax Board opinion gives no 
authority for this test).  Later in the same paragraph, the dissent also raises the “meaning or 
application” language, but, rather than citing Franchise Tax Board or Smith, it cites instead T. B. 
Harms Co.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (stating “plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law”). 
 215. City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997).  The opinion also cites 
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936), but that reference is better understood as a 
requirement that the federal issue be directly raised. 
 216. After impliedly criticizing the Smith “construction or application” test as “somewhat 
generous” and “subject to some trimming,” the Court mentions “validity, construction or effect” as 
an ancestor of the idea that the case must present “a serious federal interest in claiming the 
advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005).  The advantages of a federal forum apparently are the 
traditional justifications for a federal court decision.  See infra note 284 and accompanying text 
(referencing the traditional rationales for federal question jurisdiction). 
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have to be highly insightful to see that the looser the language and the 
more pragmatic the considerations, the greater the ability of the federal 
court to reach a result it deems equitable in the individual case. 
2. Development Through Hard Cases Leads to Bad Law 
The trite bromide is hard cases make bad law.  It holds true here.  
After American Well Works confirmed the rule that a case arises under 
the law that creates the claim, the Court has decided a handful of cases 
that refuse to accept that rule.  Every one was a hard case. 
The fountainhead case holding that a federal question can be found 
in a claim created by state law was Smith.  The plaintiff challenged the 
validity of a major federal loan program and the nation needed a prompt 
ruling.217  Smith was a hard case. 
While Merrell Dow did not uphold federal jurisdiction, it did confuse 
this area of law for twenty years to the extent it produced a three-way 
circuit conflict.218  Plaintiffs from Canada and Scotland sued in Ohio.219  
The defendant first removed the case to federal court and only then 
moved for dismissal on forum non conveniens.220  Both sides were 
obviously engaged in forum shopping.221  Merrell Dow was a hard case. 
Grable & Sons announced a multifactor, pragmatic test to use when 
a federal issue is embedded in a state law claim.222  The plaintiff had lost 
its property for failure to pay federal taxes, failed to redeem, and then 
waited five years before challenging the tax sale.223  Grable & Sons was 
a hard case. 
The fact that the cases diverging from the American Well Works rule 
are all hard cases should cast doubt on their analytical bases.  
                                                     
 217. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the national importance of Smith and 
the need for a timely ruling).  Some have claimed the difference between the seemingly 
irreconcilable decisions in Smith and Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 291 U.S. 205 
(1934), is the strength of the federal interest involved.  See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986) (discussing the difference in results in relation to the 
nature of the federal issues at stake).  A more powerful, simpler, explanation is Smith was a hard 
case. 
 218. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of three-way circuit 
conflicts). 
 219. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805. 
 220. Id. at 806. 
 221. See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text (discussing the forum changes in Merrell 
Dow). 
 222. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). 
 223. See supra notes 104–12 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural history of 
Grable & Sons). 
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Considerations of equity, rather than sound legal analysis, produced 
Grable & Sons.  Certainly no other area of federal jurisdiction has 
developed through one hard case after another. 
3. The Inevitable Result Is Litigation and Circuit Conflicts 
A jurisdictional rule should be understandable, predictable, and easy 
to apply.224  Litigation over jurisdiction wastes the resources of both 
courts and litigants.  This is especially so in the case of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction because objection is never waived, and an appellate 
court can wipe out all proceedings below it by concluding no federal 
jurisdiction ever existed.225  Lack of predictability promotes litigation.226  
These commonplace observations are writ large in the procedural 
histories of the more recent decisions of the Court: all of the federal court  
 
                                                     
 224. Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
683, 683–84 (1981) says this: 
  One of the first things we teach entering law students is the importance of clarity in 
rules governing courts’ jurisdiction.  One reason for jurisdictional rules to be clear and 
simple is that litigating at length over the proper forum in which to litigate is a poor use 
of limited judicial resources, expensive to the parties and to the public.  . . . Another 
reason simplicity is desirable in jurisdictional rules is that jurisdictional objections can be 
raised for the first time quite late in the proceedings . . . rendering meaningless all the 
litigation on the merits that has occurred in the lower courts. 
See infra notes 225–29 and accompanying text (noting that rules regarding jurisdiction should be 
bright-line rules).  Even the author of the article that may have started the Court on the path to 
pragmatism said “[i]t goes without saying that it is undesirable for jurisdictional rules to be 
uncertain.”  Cohen, supra note 7, at 908.  He was unconcerned that a pragmatic test for jurisdiction 
would cause uncertainty because he predicted “recognition of pragmatic factors and decisions based 
on them will lead to predictable jurisdictional standards.”  Id.  That was an exceedingly poor 
prediction.  See infra notes 230–32 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A.5 (discussing 
the bright line drawn by the American Well Works rule and the desirability of bright-line rules). 
 225. See CHAFEE, supra note 192, at 312 (“[A]n enormous amount of expensive legal ability will 
be used up on jurisdictional issues when it could be much better spent upon elucidating the merits of 
cases.”); Field, supra note 224, at 683 (“[L]itigating at length over the proper forum in which to 
litigate is a poor use of limited judicial resources . . . .”); London, supra note 62, at 835 (“Poorly 
defined criteria in the area of jurisdiction are especially wasteful, generating as they often do 
expensive and protracted litigation over threshold issues, rather than . . . merits.”); Shapiro, supra 
note 96, at 567 (“[O]riginal jurisdiction is best determined at the outset of the case . . . .”); Note, Mr. 
Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2278 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith] (“[T]here is a particularly great need for 
clarity in articulating jurisdictional principles . . . .”). 
 226. Even before the complications of Franchise Tax Board, Merrell Dow, and Grable & Sons, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter called the question of a federal issue embedded in a state law claim the 
“litigation-provoking problem.”  Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  More recently, an appellate court complained “this is a remarkably 
tangled corner of the law.”  Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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proceedings were for naught in both Franchise Tax Board227 and Merrell 
Dow.228 
The cases after American Well Works have stepped farther and 
farther away from the basic principle of certainty in jurisdictional 
doctrine.  They have replaced an understandable and certain 
jurisdictional rule with a pragmatic, weighing test that is so malleable it 
amounts to no more than an equitable decision on whether federal 
jurisdiction “ought” to exist in the individual case.229  The result has 
been, and will continue to be, uncertainty and litigation instead of 
guidance. 
Empirical proof of that proposition is found in the fact that lower 
federal courts were not able to find rhyme or reason in Merrell Dow, 
splitting three ways on its proper interpretation.230  One commentary 
counted sixty-nine appeals involving a federal issue embedded in a state 
law claim in the years from 1994 to 2002; the circuit courts of appeals 
reversed forty-five of the sixty-nine district court decisions.231  Another 
author undertook to read these sixty-nine appellate opinions and 
concluded they failed to “establish a coherent framework” for federal 
jurisdiction in the area.232 
                                                     
 227. The plaintiff sued in California state court.  The defendant removed to federal court.  That 
court denied remand, and later decided the case for the plaintiff on the merits.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and denied rehearing.  The Supreme Court postponed consideration of jurisdiction pending 
argument on the merits.  Following that argument, the Court finally held no federal jurisdiction, 
which sent the plaintiff back to state court to begin anew.  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, 
Pub. L. No. 99-336, 100 Stat. 633. 
 228. The plaintiffs filed separate actions against defendant in Ohio state court.  The defendant 
removed to federal court, and the cases were consolidated.  Plaintiffs moved to remand, which the 
court denied.  The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens.  
The Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the case remanded to state court.  The plaintiffs obtained a 
writ of certiorari; the Supreme Court affirmed, which sent plaintiffs back to state court to begin 
anew.  Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–07 (1986). 
 229. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2362, 2368 (2005) 
(rejecting a “single, precise, all-embracing” test for federal jurisdiction in favor of a balancing test). 
 230. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (recognizing the three-way split caused by 
Merrell Dow). 
 231. Mr. Smith, supra note 225, at 2280. 
 232. The author wrote as follows: 
I have had occasion to read a fair number of those sixty-nine decisions, and I think it is 
fair to say that one finds some surprising statements in them.  Overall, the decisions leave 
me, at least, doubtful whether federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them 
are, can in fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of subject matter 
jurisdiction predicated not upon a federal claim for relief but instead upon a federal 
ingredient in a state law claim for relief. 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1913 
(2004). 
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The lower federal courts certainly will not find firmer guidance in 
Grable & Sons.  The opinion’s test of pragmatic considerations 
guarantees litigation and circuit conflicts.  The Court assumes judges can 
coherently and consistently apply a weighing test of broad discretion, but 
the results show otherwise.233 
The reason is that the test emerging from the cases leading up to and 
including Grable & Sons is no more than formless equity.234  The results 
in equity follow the chancellor’s individual sense of fairness.  The results 
in this area of federal question jurisdiction will follow the judge’s 
individual sense of proper allocation of jurisdiction between federal and 
state courts. 
This Part explored the problems with the Court’s work in this area of 
federal jurisdiction.  The next Part of this Article argues the Court should 
return to the workable and predictable rule of American Well Works that 
federal question jurisdiction is determined by the law that creates the 
claim.235  It then responds to arguments that might be raised against the 
American Well Works rule.236 
IV. A SENSIBLE RULE: A CASE ARISES UNDER THE LAW THAT CREATES 
THE CLAIM 
The Supreme Court should decide that for purposes of federal 
question jurisdiction a case arises under the law that creates the claim.  
That, of course, is the well-known rule of American Well Works.237 
                                                     
 233. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (discussing the three-way split caused by 
Merrell Dow and rates of reversal of district court decisions on jurisdiction); infra Part IV.A.5 
(discussing the bright jurisdictional line drawn by American Well Works and its advantages).  The 
Court buys in to the poor prediction that accumulation of decisions based on pragmatic factors will 
eventually lead to certainty of decision.  See supra note 224 (recognizing the prediction and its 
failure to come true). 
 234. Even an author who celebrates federal courts recognized the Merrell Dow test to be “free-
standing, subjective, and individualized.”  Redish, supra note 99, at 1794.  Certainly, the test of 
Grable & Sons is no more solid. 
 235. See infra Part IV.A. 
 236. See infra Part IV.B. 
 237. The suggestion to return to the American Well Works rule is not original.  It was made 
twenty years ago in Hirshman, supra note 7, at 63.  The plea becomes even more pointed after the 
ensuing decisions in Merrell Dow and Grable & Sons. 
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A. Arguments in Favor of the Rule 
1. The Rule Works 
The number of cases in which a federal issue is embedded in a claim 
created by state law is a minuscule slice of federal question cases.238  
Unless some portion of that six-hundredths of one percent of cases is 
likely to include cases that necessarily must be heard originally in a 
federal court, which cannot be so,239 then the efforts expended in 
identifying those few cases far exceed any possible benefits.240  In other 
words, the game is not worth the candle.241 
The American Well Works rule that a case arises under the law that 
creates the claim is a powerful and predictable separator in 99.94% of 
cases presenting an issue of federal question jurisdiction.  The rule 
works. 
2. The Rule Respects “Arising Under” Language of Constitution and 
Statute 
Article III extends federal jurisdiction to “[c]ases . . . arising under,” 
and § 1331 of the 1875 Act grants jurisdiction to “actions arising 
under.”242  The considered choices of “cases” and “actions” are intended 
to refer broadly to a case in the sense of an entire bundle of facts,243 
                                                     
 238. One commentator found that in the year 1986, federal dockets included nearly 100,000 
federal question cases; 76 (.076%) resulted in a reported decision discussing a federal issue in a state 
law claim.  For the year 1994, 136,000 federal question cases on the dockets resulted in 81 (.06%) 
reported decisions discussing the issue.  Mr. Smith, supra note 225, at 2286.  Of course, this 
underestimates the number of cases somewhat because it counts only reported decisions. 
The opinion of the Court in Merrell Dow mirrored that in Franchise Tax Board in the 
understated admission that the “‘vast majority’” of federal question cases are covered by the 
American Well Works rule.  Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) 
(quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).  The dissent was 
even more grudging, admitting only the “majority” of cases are explained by the “adage.”  Merrell 
Dow, 478 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 239. See supra Part III.A.1 (stating federal question jurisdiction exists over cases, not issues). 
 240. Cf. supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (discussing that, from 1994 to 2002, federal 
appellate courts reversed forty-five of sixty-nine district court decisions, and suggesting that the 
cases have provided no framework for federal jurisdiction). 
 241. See FALLON, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 105–06 (suggesting the test of 
American Well Works avoids the need for “refined and uncertain analysis—an analysis that some 
courts may not handle successfully”); Meltzer, supra note 232, at 1915 (“[I]f the costs of a more 
complex approach are realized in a relatively small fraction of cases, so, too, are the benefits.”). 
 242. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see also supra notes 1–2 and 
accompanying text (discussing the scope of federal jurisdiction). 
 243. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing how federal question jurisdiction exists over cases, not 
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which today is essentially synonymous with a “transaction or 
occurrence,” or a “claim.”244 
Recent cases have abandoned the understanding that federal question 
jurisdiction applies to cases and instead apply it to individual issues 
within cases.  The most obvious example of this is Merrell Dow, in 
which the only federal issue was found in one of four tort elements in 
one of six theories of recovery.245  That is truly a federal issue embedded 
within a state law claim.  It is not a “case,” and it is not an “action.” 
The rule of American Well Works respects the understanding that the 
jurisdictional grant is for cases, not for single issues.  By ruling that a 
case arises under the law that creates the claim, the rule operates case-
wide, which in turn ensures that the federal interest in the case is 
substantial.246  This results in proper allocation of jurisdiction between 
state and federal courts. 
3. The Rule Respects Both State Court and Congressional Authority 
A pragmatic, weighing test both intrudes upon the authority of state 
courts as primary givers of state law247 and usurps the authority of 
Congress to control federal jurisdiction.248  The rule of American Well 
Works, that a case arises under the law that creates the claim, does 
neither. 
The rule respects the authority of state courts to declare state law in 
state law claims.  A case containing a federal issue embedded in a state 
law claim will commence and remain in state court.  The state court will 
be able to declare its own law, which will almost always comprise nearly 
the entire case.  Additionally, the federal court will not be subject to 
potential embarrassment by making a nonbinding prediction of state 
law.249 
                                                                                                                                  
issues). 
 244. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the misunderstanding regarding “cause of action” and 
“claim”). 
 245. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–06 (1986). 
 246. Cf. Alleva, supra note 20, at 1508 (“It certainly helps to ensure that federal law will govern 
disposition and define the contours of the claim, thus providing strong justification for section 1331 
jurisdiction.”); Redish, supra note 99, at 1793 (“[O]ne could reasonably conclude that federal 
interests are not sufficiently implicated to justify the assertion of federal jurisdiction unless the actual 
cause of action is federal . . . .”). 
 247. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the resulting misallocation of jurisdiction between state 
and federal courts). 
 248. See supra Part III.B (discussing the usurping of congressional power over federal 
jurisdiction). 
 249. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (citing a case where the Court stated that 
deciding state law can result in embarrasment for federal courts). 
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The rule respects the authority of Congress to grant or deny federal 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, one writer has said “[t]he American Well Works test 
is also the purest reflection of Congress’s plenary power to define the 
scope of federal jurisdiction.”250  The rule stops usurpation of 
congressional authority and the creeping expansion of federal jurisdiction 
by the courts in this area.251 
4. The Rule Respects the Limited Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, and Is 
Consistent with Other Jurisdictional Decisions 
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is not Janus-faced.  It faces in one 
direction only, and that direction is limitation.252  The American Well 
Works rule limits federal jurisdiction to cases created by federal law.  A 
test—such as Grable & Sons—that searches a state law case for a single 
issue of federal law is not limited. 
The Justices should never forget it is a statute they are 
expounding.253  Even granting the “arising under” language of the 
Constitution extends to cases with a federal issue embedded in a state 
law claim,254 they recognize the statutory grant is narrower than the 
constitutional grant.255  Cases construing § 1331 since 1875 have 
consistently interpreted the statute narrowly.256  The rule of American 
Well Works fits snugly.  A test that allows a federal court to prospect for 
a federal issue in a state law claim stands almost alone in the realm of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.257 
                                                     
 250. Fuller, supra note 102, at 1452. 
 251. “If federalism and comity are values that are still important, then the judicial expansion of 
federal jurisdiction in the ad hoc manner that an unfettered substantial-federal-question doctrine 
allows should be troubling.”  Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1820 (1998). 
 252. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of federal jurisdiction as 
provided by the Constitution and Congress). 
 253. “[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”  McCullough v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 254. The seminal case construing the constitutional language is of course Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, which read the language broadly.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819–23 (1824), superseded 
by statute, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1349, 62 Stat. 869, 934.  Osborn was decided in an era of 
nation building, and its expansionary attitude may not do today.  See Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (“Osborn . . . appears to have been based on premises that 
today . . . are subject to criticism.”); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936) (“[E]arly 
cases were less exacting than the recent ones.”); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 
214–15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Osborn Case has been criticized and regretted.”). 
 255. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983); see also WRIGHT & 
KANE, supra note 39, § 17, at 105 (discussing how the statutory language has been construed). 
 256. See supra Part III.C (showing a general trend toward narrow interpretation since 1875). 
 257. The only other expansionary jurisdictional doctrine that comes to mind is supplemental 
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More specifically, other well-known and well-accepted jurisdictional 
doctrines limit federal jurisdiction by looking to the complaint and the 
plaintiff’s intention in pleading.  The rule of American Well Works is 
consistent with all of these doctrines; a test that searches a state law 
complaint for a single, perhaps unintended, federal issue is not.  The 
well-pleaded complaint rule encourages a plaintiff to plead the basic 
elements of a claim;258 Grable & Sons encourages a plaintiff seeking 
federal jurisdiction to include excess allegations to convince the court the 
federal issue is necessary, substantial, and disputed.259  The rule that a 
federal question cannot arise in defense requires the federal question to 
arise in the complaint;260 Grable & Sons requires the court to find that 
the federal issue is “actually disputed.”261  The rule that the plaintiff is 
master of the complaint allows the plaintiff to choose the law and the 
jurisdiction to which he appeals;262 Grable & Sons makes the judge the 
master of the complaint.263 
                                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), which is based on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715, 725–29 (1966).  That doctrine is not analogous, however, as it allows the federal court to 
bring in state law questions only after a finding of a federal jurisdictional basis. 
 258. The case usually cited is Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).  See 
13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3566, at 83–88 (explaining the implications of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule). 
 259. One commentator complained that Merrell Dow would induce “litigants to suggest that a 
particular combination of these factors and rationales for extending jurisdiction either cuts in favor 
of or against federal question jurisdiction.”  Fuller, supra note 102, at 1459.  Grable & Sons elevates 
this suggestion to a requirement. 
 260. The case usually cited is Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 
(1908).  See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3566, at 84 (explaining that a federal 
question may not be raised in a defense). 
 261. Actual dispute cannot be determined without examining the answer.  Cf. supra note 67 
(calling for courts to distinguish between “basic” and “collateral” controversies). 
 262. The case usually cited is The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).  
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“The [well-pleaded complaint] rule 
makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive 
reliance on state law.”); Great N. Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (explaining how a 
plaintiff can affect the removability of his or her case); 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 
2, § 3722, at 453 n.97 (listing cases discussing plaintiff as master of the complaint). 
 263. The following scenario, similar to the facts of Merrell Dow, provides a good example.  The 
plaintiff pleads a state law claim in a state court, and the defendant removes.  The federal court 
searches the complaint and finds a federal issue embedded in the state law claim.  The plaintiff, who 
likely believed she was relying entirely on state law and state court jurisdiction, is no longer the 
master of her own complaint and jurisdictional choice. 
This is different from other removal situations.  When diversity exists, or when the plaintiff 
pleads a claim based at least in part on federal law, removal is within the choice the plaintiff makes 
in pleading.  When the plaintiff pleads a state law claim in the complaint, and the defendant 
successfully removes because the court discovers a federal issue embedded in the state law, that 
result is not within the choice the plaintiff makes in pleading. 
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5. The Rule Draws a Bright Jurisdictional Line 
The American Well Works rule draws a bright line between federal 
cases and state cases.  Rules of subject matter jurisdiction, and most 
particularly those governing federal subject matter jurisdiction, should be 
bright-line rules.264  A bright jurisdictional line allows predictability, 
stability, and efficiency.265  Indeed, nearly all rules governing federal 
jurisdiction, with the exception of this narrow area of federal questions, 
are bright-line rules.266 
Critics complain that the American Well Works rule is wooden and 
inflexible,267 but that is desirable in jurisdictional rules.  Two that apply 
directly to federal question jurisdiction cases are the well-pleaded 
complaint rule and its companion rule that no federal question can arise 
in defense.  Both rules have been followed without deviation since 
creation.  These are both bright-line rules that are applied “woodenly,” 
even though they could easily be made more nuanced and hospitable 
toward federal jurisdiction.268  These rigid rules should be even more 
objectionable than the American Well Works rule because, in cases 
rejected by those two rules, the federal issue may often control the case,  
 
                                                     
 264. See CHAFEE, supra note 192, at 312 (“In short, a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily 
and fast what belongs in his court and what has no business there.”); David P. Currie, The Federal 
Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 1), 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) (“Jurisdiction should 
be as self-regulated as breathing; the principal job of the courts is to decide whether the plaintiff gets 
his money, and litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and 
resources.”); see also supra notes 192, 224–26 and accompanying text; cf. AM. LAW INST., supra 
note 116, at 171–72 (stating a “sophisticated analysis” for removal jurisdiction is undesirable); John 
Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Application 
of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 
1867 (1996) (“Courts and litigants will benefit most if a bright line can be drawn to insure 
predictability of the appellate forum, even if the bright line permits some patent issues to go to 
regional circuits and some non-patent issues to be appealed to the Federal Circuit.”). 
 265. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (noting the advantage of using bright-line 
jurisdictional rules). 
 267. See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 268. The well-pleaded complaint rule could be expanded to allow plaintiffs to add special 
jurisdictional allegations in federal question cases in the same fashion as plaintiffs are required to 
plead jurisdiction in diversity cases.  See Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 665 (stating a 
complaint alleging a federal question should proceed until the court determines that no federal 
question arises); Cohen, supra note 7, at 894 n.25 (stating allegations of federal questions could be 
permitted as are “special allegations of diversity jurisdiction”); Mishkin, supra note 132, at 164 
(stating “special jurisdictional allegations” could be permitted). 
A “rational jurisdictional system” could consider the defenses raised in the answer in deciding 
whether a federal question is presented.  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 
U.S. 1, 10–11 n.9 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
336, 100 Stat. 633. 
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whereas in a situation of a federal issue embedded in a state law claim, 
the federal issue is far more likely to be isolated, remote, and collateral. 
What response would judges and commentators make to a rule that 
states diversity of citizenship jurisdiction will be left to a case-by-case 
decision based on the court’s assessment of the strength of federal 
interests in the individual case?  That is exactly what Grable & Sons 
requires in federal question cases. 
The American Well Works rule draws a bright line that is easy to 
apply.  Grable & Sons is little more than an ad hoc weighing of federal 
interests; it traces hardly any line at all.269  Courts need lines for 
jurisdictional rules. 
B. Arguments Against the Rule 
1. Minor Arguments 
Critics have made several arguments against the rule of American 
Well Works that can be characterized as minor.  This subpart clears away 
these minor arguments. 
First, say the critics, the rule that “[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action” is no more than dictum in American Well 
Works.270  This argument is based on the structure of the opinion, but it 
fails to recognize Justice Holmes was stating accepted law; the famous 
rule was not gratuitous, ill-considered dictum.271 
Second, the rule is cast in the obsolete language of “cause of action.”  
When Justice Holmes wrote the opinion in American Well Works, the 
cause of action was a centerpiece of code pleading; it has since been 
replaced by “claim for relief” in federal courts and a majority of states.272  
The obsolete phrase has caused confusion and difficulty over the 
years.273  The proper and easy response is that substitution of “claim” for 
                                                     
 269. “Jurisdictional rules should be clear.  Whatever the virtues of the Smith standard, it is 
anything but clear.”  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 
2372 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The absence of any understandable line, even prior to Grable 
& Sons, is clearly demonstrated in the failed efforts of the lower federal courts to draw a line.  See 
supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (noting that lower federal courts did not consistently 
interpret the Merrell Dow decision). 
 270. See Doernberg, supra note 20, at 630 (“Holmes’ test from American Well Works is 
dictum.”); Hirshman, supra note 7, at 27 (noting the actual ruling of American Well Works is quite 
narrow, but the opinion is much broader). 
 271. See supra Part II.B (discussing that a case arises under the law that creates the claim). 
 272. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the difference between a “cause of action” and a 
“claim”). 
 273. “In Merrell Dow, Justice Brennan and every other Justice subscribed to undifferentiated use 
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the obsolete “cause of action” avoids this confusion, although courts will 
still need to be vigilant to understand “claim” in its proper transactional 
sense.274 
Third, the rule is wooden and inflexible.275  That, of course, is the 
point of a bright-line jurisdictional rule, and jurisdictional rules should 
draw clear and understandable lines.276  Critics sometimes add that the 
rule is dysfunctional because an important federal interest may be in the 
case, and the rule prevents the federal court from using its discretion 
based on the prominence of the federal interest.277  The problem with that 
view is that the possibility of an important federal interest in a case has 
never been sufficient to raise federal jurisdiction when the federal 
interest arises outside the well-pleaded complaint or in defense.278  No 
reason exists why the rule for a federal issue embedded in a state law 
claim should be different. 
Fourth, the American Well Works rule makes little analytical sense 
because it is a but-for test that can be approached from either the state 
law or the federal law end: beginning at the state law end, state law “is 
master of the whole matter”; beginning at the federal law end, federal 
law “is master of the whole matter.”279  While this argument is opaque, it 
                                                                                                                                  
of the terms ‘count,’ ‘cause of action,’ ‘claim,’ and ‘theory’ to reject the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that unless every count . . . arose under federal law, none did.”  Oakley, supra note 53, at 
1853.  Even today, the Court bounces from term to term: “For if the federal labeling standard 
without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal 
standard without a federal cause of action.”  Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2370.  One leading 
hornbook avoids the problem by misquoting the Holmes test as “‘a suit arises under the law that 
creates the action.’”  WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 39, § 17, at 105–06. 
 274. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the misunderstanding between the term “cause of action” 
and “claim”). 
 275. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 20, at 1511 (noting “American Well’s harsh exclusive effect of 
precluding state-sanctioned claims with federal elements from federal court”); Marshall, supra note 
7, at 237 (stating the Holmes formulation is “restrictive and unflexible”). 
 276. See   Part IV.A.5 (discussing that the American Well Works rule draws a bright line between 
state and federal jurisdiction). 
 277. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 20, at 1500 (“[I]t hampered a trial court’s discretion to assess 
the prominence or dispositive nature of the federal issue embedded within the hybrid claim . . . .”); 
Doernberg, supra note 20, at 661–62 n.279 (“The American Well Works test produces results that 
are intolerable in light of the purposes of federal question jurisdiction.  It simply cannot be 
demonstrated that important federal issues arise only as parts of federally created causes of action.  
Mottley and Franchise Tax demonstrate the flaws of such a limitation, and show why the Holmes 
test is dysfunctional.”)  Both of these critics have a definite point of view.  See infra note 292  and 
accompanying text (discussing how American Well Works opponents hold federal courts in a higher 
regard). 
 278. See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text (discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule 
and noting the federal question must arise in the complaint). 
 279. The following argument was made in an influential article, which may have prompted the 
Court onto its path to pragmatism: 
Holmes’ reasoning in American Well Works was that the plaintiff’s cause of action arose 
under state law because he could not recover unless he could demonstrate that state law 
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seems to be saying that the court could interchangeably approach a case 
containing elements of both state law and federal law from either 
perspective.  That is not accurate.  The court looks to the choice made by 
the plaintiff as master of the complaint.280  The plaintiff in American 
Well Works did not sue for infringement of patent; it sued for the state 
law tort of trade defamation.  One cannot choose to begin analysis at 
either end because the plaintiff plainly sued in tort.  In fact, federal law 
entered the case only as a defense of truth to the plaintiff’s claim. 
Finally, critics say the American Well Works rule must fall because it 
cannot explain all the decisions.  This is often expressed in the well-
known phrase “[i]t has come to be realized that Mr. Justice Holmes’ 
formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it 
was intended.”281  This observation is true only to the extent that two 
problematical Supreme Court decisions over the span of a century hold 
contrary to the rule.282  The Court would do far better to reject two rogue 
decisions than a rule of law of great explanatory power.  While the Court 
is most reluctant to overrule or criticize earlier decisions, return to the 
American Well Works rule would be far more consistent with far more of 
its precedent.283 
                                                                                                                                  
gave him a right of action for trade libel—“the state is master of the whole matter.”  The 
difficulty is that this brand of “but-for” reasoning could easily have led to the opposite 
conclusion if approached from the other end.  In other words, plaintiff could not recover 
unless he could demonstrate the invalidity or limited scope of the defendant’s patent—
issues as to which federal law “is master of the whole matter.” 
Cohen, supra note 7, at 898; see also supra Part II.D (discussing the complicated path to 
pragmatism). 
 280. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (noting plaintiff is master of the complaint).  
The first substantive sentence of the opinion states “[o]f course the question depends upon the 
plaintiff’s declaration.”  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 258 (1916). 
 281. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964).  This statement has often been 
repeated uncritically.  See supra note 80 (stating this dismissal of American Well Works has been 
repeated as accepted law). 
 282. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367–68 
(2005) (finding federal jurisdiction existed in a state action); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 
255 U.S. 180, 200–01 (1921) (deciding federal question jurisdiction can arise out of a state claim).  
Once again, all goes back to Smith.  See supra Part II.C–E (discussing the impact of Smith on the 
evolution of case law regarding federal question jurisdiction). 
Many lower federal court decisions are inconsistent with American Well Works, although these 
must be discounted because they are only attempted applications of the Supreme Court’s Smith 
decision. 
 283. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (collecting Court precedents consistent with the 
American Well Works rule); infra notes 328–29 and accompanying text (highlighting that the weight 
of precedent supports the American Well Works rule). 
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2. State Courts May Be Hostile to Federal Rights 
The traditional reasons supporting federal question jurisdiction are 
that state courts may be hostile to federal rights, federal courts have 
expertise in federal law, and federal hearing is necessary for federal-law 
uniformity.284  Perhaps the most compelling of these reasons is that state 
courts may be unsympathetic to federal rights. 
This view begins with the recognition that, through congressional 
conferring of federal question jurisdiction in 1875, the federal courts 
“became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right 
given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.”285  
The unspoken premise is that the rule of American Well Works will not 
suffice because it will leave federal law at the mercy of hostile state 
courts. 
This argument must be rejected.  The drafters of the Constitution 
fully intended that state courts should be the primary decision makers on 
questions of federal law within the bounds of the Supremacy Clause.286  
Congress ratified this decision by declining to grant federal question 
jurisdiction for nearly 100 years.287 
                                                     
 284. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 116, at 164–68 (discussing the tactical advantages in 
choosing between forums as well as the benefits and pitfalls of general diversity jurisdiction); 
Currie, supra note 100, at 268 (“Federal judges have . . . expertise in dealing with federal law; 
uniform interpretation is promoted . . . [and] state courts may be hostile to federal law.”); cf. 
Doernberg, supra note 20, at 647 n.220 (stating that, although state courts traditionally did not 
enforce federal law, modern state courts can be trusted to enforce federal law). 
 285. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 28, at 65.  This statement from the pen of Justice 
Felix Frankfurter is ironic because he believed state courts were competent to decide federal 
questions, and he later authored many opinions narrowing or denying federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (discussing the Court’s 
reluctance to “expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional 
statutes”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Jones Act, ch. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291, as 
recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950) (discussing the Court’s caution in finding broad federal question 
jurisdiction). 
 286. Two commentators reached this conclusion: 
[The Framers’] Judiciary Article matched a presumption favoring state court original 
jurisdiction with one favoring federal court appellate jurisdiction in “arising under” cases, 
and permitted the use of lower federal courts when necessary to lighten the Supreme 
Court’s appellate load.  These presumptions emerged, to begin with, from Article III’s (1) 
baseline assumption of no federal inferior courts, (2) rejection of the Virginia and 
Randolph-Rutledge proposals to confine lower federal courts to original tasks, and (3) 
assignment to the Supreme Court of significant original jurisdiction . . . . All three factors 
encouraged the assignment of original tasks to state courts. 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 132, at 767–68. 
 287. “[T]he jurisdictional choices the first Congress made conform to a presumption of federal 
appellate (and also state court original) jurisdiction and strongly imply a spot-checking and 
supremacy-maintaining understanding of the federal courts’ role in reviewing state decisional and 
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The rejoinder might be that the nation transformed during and after 
the Civil War so that, by 1875, Congress saw the need to move initial 
decisions on federal law from hostile state courts to sympathetic federal 
courts.288  That rejoinder fails, however, for two reasons: (1) Congress 
apparently had no intent to assert federal dominance through the 1875 
Act;289 and (2) Congress placed a jurisdictional amount requirement on 
federal question cases.290 
A large difference exists between recognizing federal courts as 
powerful protectors of federal rights and recognizing them as the sole 
protectors of federal rights.  Consequently, at the last, we cycle around 
again to the familiar debate between those who believe state courts are 
trustworthy to decide federal law and those who believe an original 
federal court hearing is necessary to vindicate federal rights fully and 
sympathetically.291  Many opponents of the American Well Works rule  
 
                                                                                                                                  
other law.”  Id. at 778.  Another author asserts “[t]his was not an oversight but reflected a 
compromise made necessary by the determined opposition of the antifederalists to a national 
judiciary.”  London, supra note 62, at 836; see also supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text 
(discussing the early history of federal question jurisdiction). 
 288. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 20, at 1498 (“[A] post-Civil War Congress apparently 
distrustful of the state courts as the primary vindicators of federal rights.”); Bergman, supra note 20, 
at 29–30 (discussing the hostility state courts once diplayed towards federal law); Doernberg, supra 
note 20, at 603 nn.27–28 (collecting citations). 
 289. Legislative history for the 1875 Act is almost nonexistent.  The provision was added as a 
substitution in the Senate for a bill from the House making only minor adjustments in removal 
procedure.  See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 28, at 68 (“The bill left the House merely as 
minor amendments to the procedure governing removal proceedings.”); Chadbourn & Levin, supra 
note 20, at 643 ([“The Act was ] originally introduced in the House . . . in the form of a bill to amend 
the removal statute.”).  Only one Senator spoke to intent, and he said nothing about hostile states or 
state courts.  See supra note 132 (discussing Senator Matthew H. Carpenter’s comments regarding 
Congress’s grant of federal question jurisdiction).  A Congress powerfully asserting the dominance 
of the federal government and the federal courts over balky southern states would almost certainly 
have shouted its intent in the legislative history, yet a leading article concluded that the act was 
“sneak legislation.”  Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 642–43.  No one has seriously disagreed 
with this declaration since it was made.  Cf. Bergman, supra note 20, at 27–28 (discussing whether 
the grant of federal question jurisdiction was a “sneak measure” or merely a quiet grant because of 
the tension between federal and state law). 
 290. A plaintiff had to assert damages exceeding $500 to support federal question jurisdiction.  
See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3561.1.  A Congress eager to assert 
dominance over states would hardly have added—or increased from time to time over the years—a 
jurisdictional amount requirement.  The requirement was not eliminated for federal question cases 
until 1976.  Id. 
Another provision of the 1875 Act allowed a federal court to dismiss a federal question case that 
did “not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of 
said circuit court.”  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472; see also Chadbourn & 
Levin, supra note 20, at 649–63 (discussing the concept of “really and substantially”).  Again, a 
Congress asserting federal authority would not likely have included such a provision. 
 291. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 20, at 1495 n.52 (collecting citations). 
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seem to fear state court hostility, celebrate federal courts, and believe 
federal law belongs only in federal courts.292 
The American Well Works rule is neutral.  It allocates original 
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law to federal courts and 
original jurisdiction over cases arising under state law to state courts.  
The rule is consistent with the intent of the Constitution and Congress to 
trust state courts to make initial decisions on issues of federal law that 
may be encountered in a state law case.  The rule is also consistent with 
Supreme Court expressions of comity and respect for state courts.293 
A critic might argue the rule tilts in favor of state court jurisdiction.  
That is not true.  The rule is neutral.  Even were that so, the tilt would be 
consistent with the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts found in the 
Constitution, congressional enactments, and consistent decisions of the 
Supreme Court.294 
3. Federal Hearings Are Necessary for Uniformity 
The other traditional justifications for federal question jurisdiction 
are federal judges have expertise in federal law and thus will produce 
more uniform interpretations of federal law.  The conclusion follows that 
a federal issue should be drawn into federal court whenever possible.  
That conclusion, however, turns on its head in a case where a federal 
issue is embedded within a state law claim. 
                                                     
 292. See id. at 1495, 1500–01, 1524–26 (stating federal courts are “institutionally distinctive,” 
and their “discretion,” “control,” and “judicial prerogative” over jurisdiction should not be fettered); 
Doernberg, supra note 20, at 654 (discussing the “possibility of state court errors with respect to 
important matters of federal law”); Mishkin, supra note 132, at 173 (“[T]he ‘power to make 
“findings of fact” and make them binding is the power to rule the world.’” (quoting R. Carter 
Pittman, The Emancipated Judiciary in America: Its Colonial and Constitutional History, 37 A.B.A. 
J. 485, 487 (1951))); Redish, supra note 99, at 1770 (listing a seven-factor test for allocation of 
jurisdiction between state and federal courts that omits the limited nature of federal jurisdiction); The 
Outer Limits of “Arising Under”, supra note 192, at 1012 (“Many cases presenting mixed state-
federal claims seem to ‘belong’ in federal court.”); cf. Hirshman, supra note 7, at 32 (“Cohen’s 
ultimate solution is a real tribute to the federal judiciary.  . . . [H]e proposed what he calls a 
‘pragmatic’ solution to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over cases lawyers feel intuitively to be 
federal . . . .”).  See also Cohen, supra note 7, at 906, for Cohen’s pragmatic, weighing test. 
 293. The Supreme Court has come down explicitly on the side of trust in state courts.  See 
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“We are unwilling to conclude that state processes are 
unequal to the task of . . . deciding constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare 
litigation.”).  Comity and respect for state courts is also implicit in the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
in many areas, including standing and abstention.  See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 39, § 13, at 69, 
§ 52, at 325 (noting that recent cases have been more restrictive when deciding standing in federal 
courts and that, since 1941, federal courts have recognized a variety of circumstances when a federal 
court may decline to proceed although jurisdiction exists). 
 294. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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The drafters of both Article III and the 1875 Act contemplated that 
federal issues would be determined in state courts.295  Indeed, cases 
involving a federal issue embedded in a state law claim could be heard 
only in state courts from the beginning of our nation in 1789 until the 
1921 decision in Smith.296  The drafters of Article III and the 1875 Act 
were not worried about the occasional morsel of federal law that might 
appear in a state law case, and they certainly could not have foreseen—
nor would have approved—a ravenous federal judiciary gobbling up 
state law cases. 
Given that, by definition, the case raises a federal issue within the 
body of a state law claim, state law is far more likely than federal law to 
dominate the decision.  That strongly suggests the state court should be 
given the first opportunity to decide the case because it is more likely to 
be sympathetic to state law, will have expertise in its own law, and will 
be able to establish uniformity in its law.  The case stays with the 
primary source of its decisional law.297 
Even should we grant, arguendo, that the American Well Works rule 
has a price of some loss of uniformity in federal law, the question is, 
what price is being paid?  The answer is negligible.  First, in a general 
sense, the notion of uniformity among ninety-four federal district courts 
and thirteen courts of appeals, with circuit conflicts being the primary 
portion of the Supreme Court’s docket, is largely a pipe dream.  In more 
specificity, studies prove that federal courts have not achieved uniformity 
in jurisdictional law in this area.298  Second, any theoretical loss of 
uniformity in federal law will be tiny because so few cases actually 
present a federal issue embedded within a state law claim.299  Third, no 
strong federal interest cries out for uniformity and vindication in these 
cases.300  Fourth, we are considering only the general federal question 
                                                     
 295. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text (noting three factors from Article III 
encouraging the assignment of original tasks to state courts and stating the jurisdictional choices 
made by the first Congress “strongly imply a spot-checking and supremacy-maintaining 
understanding of the federal courts’ role in reviewing state decisional and other law”). 
 296. See supra Part II.A–C. 
 297. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 298. The most telling studies are Mr. Smith, supra note 225, at 2280, noting the courts of appeals 
reversed the district courts’ decisions in forty-five of the sixty-nine cases during the study period, 
and Frumkin, supra note 102, at 550–53, noting the three-way circuit conflict created by Merrell 
Dow. 
 299. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 300. Surely a strong federal interest would have manifested itself during the 132 years before 
Smith.  Likely, the proper time span is longer.  Smith stood isolated from 1789 until Grable & Sons 
in 2005.  As one commentator stated, “I see no federal interest in hearing such controversies.”  
Currie, supra note 100, at 277. 
One area of federal law most requiring uniformity is patent law; that is a major reason for the 
 
MCFARLAND FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:37:19 PM 
54 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
statute, § 1331; Congress can be expected to act in any individual area 
with a strong need for federal expertise and uniformity.301  Fifth, even 
though appeal from state court to the Supreme Court is largely 
chimerical, it is available for cases actually demonstrating a need for 
uniformity.302 
4. The Rule Does Not Satisfy the Need for Complexity 
No one has previously brought the debate over rules versus standards 
in law into a discussion of federal question jurisdiction.  Consideration 
together is instructive.  The debate over rules versus standards can be 
summarized as follows: 
A “rule” is a norm whose application turns on the presence of relatively 
noncontentious facts, and turns on the presence of those facts regardless 
whether the values that the rule is designed to serve are actually served 
or disserved by the particular application.  Rules are often described as 
“bright-line” (clear and easy to follow), “formal” (to be applied without 
                                                                                                                                  
gathering of appellate expertise over patent cases into the Federal Circuit.  Yet in Christianson v. 
Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), the Court unanimously rejected an argument 
to uniformity when it held a patent case was properly appealed to another court of appeals.  Id. at 
813–14. 
 301. This seems to be the real argument the Court was making in Merrell Dow when it tied 
federal jurisdiction to the decision of Congress not to imply a private remedy.  See supra note 175 
and accompanying text (questioning the Court’s theory that Congress must have intended no federal 
jurisdiction because Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for the federal regulatory 
scheme). 
Congress has acted many times to provide special jurisdictional statutes allowing access to the 
federal courts in areas of special federal concern.  See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 
2, §§ 3568–85 (examining particular grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts). 
 302. Perhaps the Supreme Court has been hospitable to original federal jurisdiction over a case 
with a federal issue embedded in a state law claim because of concern for its appellate jurisdiction 
that assures the supremacy of federal law.  For example, in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 
291 U.S. 205 (1934), the Court held there was no original federal jurisdiction but rushed to add 
“[q]uestions arising in actions in state courts to recover for injuries sustained by employees in 
intrastate commerce and relating to the scope or construction of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts 
are, of course, federal questions which may appropriately be reviewed in this Court.”  Id. at 214. 
This concern is unfounded.  Close reading of American Well Works shows the rule refers to the 
original jurisdiction statute.  The opinion says “[a] suit for damages to business caused by a threat to 
sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law.”  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & 
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 259 (1916). 
The “arising under” language of Article III is broader than the similar language of the statute.  
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 
39, § 17, at 105.  The Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court interpretations of federal issues 
embedded in state law claims can appropriately, and consistently with other jurisdictional doctrines, 
be broader than federal original jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 171, at 23 n.133 
(“[W]hat is a federal question for the Supreme Court is not necessarily a federal question for the 
lower courts.”); Mishkin, supra note 132, at 163, 170–71 (discussing the Supreme Court’s need for 
broad appellate jurisdiction). 
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regard to substance of the results but only with regard to the rule’s 
terms), and “opaque” (to the rules’ background justifications). 
 . . . . 
  . . . Standards are norms that have the opposite characteristics.  A 
standard can be applied only by engaging in evaluation.  Therefore, to 
the extent that evaluation is contentious and uncertain, standards will be 
as well.  Standards are thus vague, substantive (as opposed to formal), 
and transparent (to background values).303 
American Well Works sets forth a rule.304  Grable & Sons sets forth a 
standard.305  Accordingly, the latter is preferred by people desiring 
complexity in law.  The question is, to what extent is this dynamic 
behind the movement from a clear, predictable rule to a formless, 
malleable standard. 
Justice Holmes, the author of the opinion of the Court in American 
Well Works, was a man of rules writing in an age of rules.306  We are 
steadily sliding into an age of standards.307 
This is a welcome development for people promoting and celebrating 
complexity in the law.  “[T]he main producers, rationalizers, and 
administrators of law—legislators and their staff, bureaucrats, litigants, 
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars—generally benefit from legal 
complexity while bearing few of its costs.”308  Many judges celebrate 
complexity.309  Most commentators celebrate complexity.310 
                                                     
 303. Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein’s Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531, 541 (1997); see also, e.g., Larry 
Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 
nn.1–2, 1194 n.5 (1994) (collecting citations); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 n.1 (1992) (collecting citations); Peter H. Schuck, Legal 
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1992) (explaining the 
differences between legal rules and norms). 
 304. “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”  Am. Well Works Co., 241 
U.S. at 260. 
 305. “[D]oes a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). 
 306. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) 
(“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law.”). 
 307. See Schuck, supra note 303, at 10 (“A movement from rules to more complex standards has 
been evident for some time.”). 
 308. Id. at 26. 
 309. “The judge may wish to reduce her boredom, call attention to herself in order to attract 
support from special interests, or burnish her reputation for creativity, independence, and 
professional skill with lawyers, academics, journalists, and other court-watchers.”  Id. at 33–34. 
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One can easily recognize the rule-to-standard movement from American Well Works to Grable 
& Sons in the following statement: 
Spurred on by many legal scholars, [courts] openly embraced a conception of role, a style 
of thought, and a rhetoric of decision that legitimated judicial policymaking in a variety 
of areas.  . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . .[C]ourts in both private and public law [adopt] certain common decision 
methodologies that vastly complexify the system.  Important examples include interest-
balancing, sequential burden-shifting, and broad but incomplete, spasmodic deference to 
other institutions.  By requiring judges to balance numerous diverse, and inevitably 
conflicting, policy goals, these doctrines are bound to be both technical and 
indeterminate. 
Id. at 14–15 (citations omitted). 
One judge who helped initiate the movement was Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo with his 
beautiful prose in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936): 
What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to 
kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of 
causation.  . . . [T]here has been a selective process which picks the substantial causes out 
of the web and lays the other ones aside.  . . . If we follow the ascent far enough, 
countless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits 
in the provisions of a federal statue or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient 
restrictions upon legislative power.  To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have 
formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic and those that are 
collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possible.  We 
shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by. 
A more active participant in the movement was Justice William J. Brennan with his more 
pedestrian, yet harder pushing, prose in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 
99-336, 100 Stat. 633: 
  Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted, . . . the statutory phrase “arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” has resisted all attempts to frame a 
single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall 
outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts.  . . . [T]he phrase “arising under” 
masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the 
proper management of the federal judicial system. 
 310. As one commentator assessed his colleagues: 
  Scholars’ views of simplicity are, well, more complex.  On the one hand, simplicity 
cuts across our intellectual grain.  We have a strong taste for complexity; indeed 
complexity amounts to a craft value . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Perhaps because legal scholars are generally less interested than their natural and 
behavioral science colleagues in discovering new data and testing theories, they have 
been that much busier seeking to elaborate novel theories and subvert traditional 
paradigms. 
Schuck, supra note 303, at 1, 35 (citation omitted); cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
(1991) (arguing the utility of adherence to rules in law). 
The article that may have started the Supreme Court on its path to pragmatism lays out the 
multiple, pragmatic considerations that, it argues, a court should consider in deciding jurisdiction.  
Cohen, supra note 7, at 906–07.  Reading those two pages leaves me with the definite impression 
that the author believes a multifaceted, pragmatic test for federal question jurisdiction in a case 
arising under state law is desirable for the same reason a person works the daily crossword puzzle in 
the newspaper: the joy of demonstrating mental gymnastics.  I say the subscription price to lower 
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Who is to speak for simplicity and rules?  People outside the legal 
profession.311  People inside the legal profession who highly value the 
benefits of simplicity to be found in rules: minimized costs, equal 
treatment, predictable planning, and accountability.312  Unfortunately, the 
people concerned with federal question jurisdiction have little motive to 
scribe for simplicity.313 
One might wonder, if rules are too simpleminded for complex human 
activity, why should the law countenance any?  Why should not equity 
govern all?  The answer is that rules are inappropriate for some areas of 
human enterprise, but they are entirely appropriate for others.314 
One area of particular desirability for rules is jurisdiction and 
procedure.315  No one would suggest pure equity for res judicata.316  
Courts do not discuss filing deadlines in terms of multifactored interests 
tests.  In federal court, a party who fails to move for judgment as a matter 
of law at the close of evidence cannot make the motion after the verdict; 
the court does not weigh the interests.317  A complaint alleging “plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                  
court judges and litigants is too high. 
 311. “Simplicity is a compelling virtue.  Poets praise it.  Artists pursue it.  Moralists preach it.  
Monastics live it.  . . . [T]he principle of Ockham’s Razor asserts that simpler theories possess 
greater methodological, epistemological, and aesthetic elegance and value.”  Schuck, supra note 
303, at 1–2 (citations omitted). 
 312. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 110–15 (1996) 
(citing the benefits of rules); see also supra Part IV.A (explaining why the Supreme Court should 
adopt the rule that “for purposes of federal question jurisdiction a case arises under the law that 
created the claim”). 
 313. The chorus of complexity has many voices.  Some appellate judges strive for complexity.  
See supra note 309 (discussing what motivates judicial complexity).  Complexity is a “craft value” 
to most legal scholars.  See supra note 310 (discussing what attracts legal scholars to complexity).  
Lawyers have little incentive for simplicity since it cuts into billable hours. 
On the other hand, those favoring simplicity have no organized voice.  Overworked lower-court 
judges cannot challenge Supreme Court doctrine.  Individual litigants have no recurring interest.  
Federal jurisdiction is not salient to groups that lobby Congress, such as taxpayers, 
environmentalists, and civil libertarians.  Congress as an institution might be expected to resist 
attempts to infringe on its jurisdictional prerogative.  See supra Part III.B (discussing judicial 
usurpation of congressional authority to determine the limits of federal jurisdiction).  But it responds 
to interest groups, not to legal theoreticians. 
 314. See Kennedy, supra note 179, at 1702–03 (comparing rules and standards in different 
contexts); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision: A Theory of Judicial Decision for Today 
(pt. 3), 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951–52 (1923) (comparing rules, standards, and the situations for 
which each are distinctly suited); cf. Alexander, supra note 303, at 544 (“Rules make our value 
differences immaterial in legal reasoning.  Standards make those differences pivotal.”). 
 315. See Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 20, at 671 (“[P]robably all would agree that 
jurisdiction and procedure (matters apart from ‘the justice of the cause’) are technical matters to be 
governed by technical rules which should be easy of comprehension and application.”); see also 
supra Part IV.A.5 (arguing bright-line rules should govern subject matter jurisdiction). 
 316. “Res judicata reflects the policy that sometimes it is more important that a judgment be 
stable than that it be correct.”  JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.3, at 636 (3d ed. 1999) (citation omitted). 
 317. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(c). 
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are late of the district of Maryland, merchants” is insufficient to plead 
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction.318  A court faced with a federal 
question raised for the first time in defense does not weigh the interests 
of having a federal court decide the issue.319 
Some areas of law shout out for rules, and one of those areas is 
jurisdiction.  That is especially important for federal courts of limited 
jurisdiction.320  No need for complexity overcomes other clear rules of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.321  The Court should not allow any 
amorphous desire to demonstrate complex intellectual skills to overcome 
the sensible and certain American Well Works rule that a case arises 
under the law that creates the claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article discusses federal question jurisdiction over a case 
presenting a federal law issue embedded within a claim created by state 
law.  Even though these cases are few and far between,322 this small area 
provides nearly all of the major decisions on federal question jurisdiction 
by the Supreme Court over the past century.  The Court in American 
Well Works declares the rule that a case arises under the law that creates 
the claim.323  Later cases lead to Grable & Sons, in which the Court 
enunciates a multifactor, weighing test.324  This Article analyzes the 
many reasons the Court’s approach is problematic.325  It then collects 
arguments for, and responds to arguments against, a return to the 
American Well Works rule.326 
Of course, Congress could assert its dominance in the field of federal 
jurisdiction and amend § 1331.327  After more than 130 years without 
                                                     
 318. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809). 
 319. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154 (1908). 
 320. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 179. 
 322. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 323. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 324. See supra Part II.D–E. 
 325. See supra Part III. 
 326. See supra Part IV. 
 327. Redrafting should make clear that the statute grants jurisdiction to federal cases, not to 
federal law issues.  See supra Part III.A.1.  “The general clause should not be cast in constitutional 
language.  Its scope should be expressly limited to cases where the plaintiff’s claim for relief is 
founded on the Constitution, laws, or treaties.”  Wechsler, supra note 167, at 225.  “[T]he statute 
could profitably and clearly be made to exclude [federal issues in state claim cases] by requiring that 
federal law operate of its own force in order to support jurisdiction.”  Currie, supra note 100, at 277; 
cf. London, supra note 62, at 855 (stating the “dependence of the jurisdictional statute upon an 
express federal cause of action is a reciprocal one . . . in the sense that federal jurisdiction could not 
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substantive language change to this basic jurisdictional statute, 
amendment seems unlikely. 
Absent congressional intervention, the Supreme Court should rethink 
the malleable and mushy test of Grable & Sons and return to the 
powerful and predictable rule of American Well Works.  That course 
would require disapproval of two precedents,328 yet be consistent with 
many more.329  The rule would also be consistent with other related 
federal jurisdiction doctrines.330  The Court, for federal question 
jurisdiction, would “set bounds to the pursuit . . . [by formulating] the 
distinction between controversies that are basic and those that are  
 
                                                                                                                                  
be predicated on such a right alone”). 
 With this redrafting would come a designation more appropriate than federal question 
jurisdiction: federal case jurisdiction, arising under jurisdiction, or federal claim jurisdiction.  See 
Mishkin, supra note 132, at 170–71 (suggesting “federal claim” terminology for original 
jurisdiction). 
 328. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2363 (2005) 
(holding “the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently 
substantial to support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction”); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust 
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (stating “where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff 
that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under 
[Judicial Code § 24]”). 
 329. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936) (finding that the fact a federal 
statute was the source of a state’s authority was insufficient to exercise federal question jurisdiction); 
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 216–17 (1934) (declining to exercise federal 
question jurisdiction when a railroad employee injured in intrastate commerce brought the case 
under a state statute patterned after the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Federal Safety 
Appliance Acts); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 484 (1933) (holding “a suit does not 
arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States merely because a state is the plaintiff, 
though the State derives its authority to maintain the suit from the Federal Constitution and laws”); 
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 259–60 (1916) (holding plaintiff’s suit 
alleging libel in relation to a patent arises under state law, not federal patent law); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 237 U.S. 300, 303 (1915) (“[W]hen . . . the foundation of the 
right claimed is a state law, the suit to assert it arises under the state law none the less that the state 
law has attached a condition that only alien legislation can fulfill.”); The Fair v. Kohler Die & 
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (exercising federal jurisdiction when the plaintiff as master of 
the complaint chose to sue under federal patent laws); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 207 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1907) (holding the force given to a state charter is derived 
“wholly from the charter” even though it may incorporate another law); Miller’s Ex’rs v. Swann, 
150 U.S. 132, 136–37 (1893) (holding “[t]he fact that the state statute and the mortgage refer to 
certain acts of Congress as prescribing the rule and measure of the rights granted by the State, does 
not make the determination of such rights a Federal question”); cf. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. 
Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (holding federal law governs all interstate shipments 
because “[a] carrier’s claim is . . . predicated on the tariff—not an understanding with the shipper”); 
Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 426 (1883) (holding “under the bankruptcy act of 1867, the 
District Court of the United States, sitting in bankruptcy, has jurisdiction to order the seizure and 
detention of goods . . . [and] the property of the bankrupt”); see also supra Part II.B–C. 
 330. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
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collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely 
possible.”331  That would be a true compass through the maze. 
 
                                                     
 331. Gully, 299 U.S. at 118.  These bounds would allow the Court to devote itself to solving new 
problems rather than policing old solutions in federal question jurisdiction.  See Mishkin, supra note 
132, at 159 (stating “it is desirable that Congress be competent to bring to an initial forum all cases 
in which the vindication of federal policy may be at stake,” but there are limits such as “volume of 
litigation” and geographic hardships for litigants). 
